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The air is smoky outside my office (a room in my house better known as the 
kitchen), officially “unhealthy,” but no longer hazardous to breathe. My family 
and I finally finished emptying all the hastily packed boxes that we took with 
us when we were ordered to evacuate in the face of a swift-moving wildfire. We 
were among the lucky ones: our home is safe and life is back to “normal” for now, 
whatever normal may be these days. 
Wildfires throughout the western United States, typhoons in Oceania, economic 
upheaval and pandemic across the globe; violent extremism is only one of the 
many catastrophes that are unfolding around us in this strange and unpredictable 
year. What is predictable is that most of us will continue trying to live our lives the 
best we can: working from home if we're lucky; venturing out to jobs in now-risky 
public spaces if we're less lucky; or wondering if we'll ever be lucky enough to find 
a job again. It is also predictable that certain groups of people will continue to tear 
at the structures of society in the mistaken belief that building something new is 
no harder than destroying what exists. Boko Haram, al Shabaab, and the Taliban 
continue to take innocent lives as indiscriminately as the coronavirus, while al 
Qaeda and ISIS, it seems, lie low and rebuild. One has to wonder, when a vaccine 
finally allows us to come out of our houses into the streets and stadiums again, 
will the extremists be far away? Compassion and generosity can be hard to come 
by when anger and fear roam free, but they are what can bring us through these 
painful times.
This issue begins with a look at a special counterterrorism unit in the Netherlands 
that combines members and tactics of the police and special forces. Based on his 
work with this unit, the author sees ways in which the Netherlands' SOF might 
improve its effectiveness by adopting and adapting certain police methods. Next 
up, Glenn E. Robinson's article on what he terms "movements of rage" introduces 
a new concept with which to understand highly violent movements across cul-
tural, religious, and national boundaries. It focuses on sociopolitical movements 
that are characterized by nihilistic violence and apocalyptic ideologies.
The CTX interview brings you former Iraqi Ambassador to the United Nations 
Feisal al-Istrabadi. Ian Rice and Craig Whiteside spoke with the ambassador 
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about his experience helping to write a new Iraqi constitution following the 
overthrow of Saddam Hussein's government, and about his perception of current 
obstacles to productive relations between Iraq and the United States. Ethicist 
George Lober then takes an unblinking look at the corrosive effects of dishonesty 
on human relations, from very personal interactions to institutional hierarchies. 
Once a lie has been introduced, he posits, it will eat away at trust and corrupt 
loyalty no matter how much the liar, and even the victim, may imagine otherwise. 
We're excited to introduce our new column on serious games, The Game Floor. 
MSG David Long writes about transforming one of Global ECCO's new games, 
CyberWar: 2025, from a somewhat awkward board game concept into a fast-
moving multiplayer online game. He offers insights into how the design and 
development of an online strategic game tracks with its pedagogical purpose.
Finally, MAJ Daniel Meegan reviews a book by Israeli investigative journalist 
Ronen Bergman about the covert assassination program carried out by Israel's 
Mossad over many decades, and MAJ Nate Smith reviews a recent book by 
Audrey Kurth Cronin on the role that technological innovation is playing in 
twenty-first-century terrorism. 
Be sure to take a look at the latest publications from the Joint Special Operations 
University.
CTX is written by, for, and about you and your fellow counterterrorism profes-
sionals. Our mission is to bring you stories, essays, research, and ideas that will 
inspire and encourage you as you pursue your mission of combating violent 
extremism wherever it arises. What would you like to share with the community? 
What ideas do you have to make CTX even better?  Write to us at CTXSubmit@
GlobalECCO.org and follow Global ECCO on Facebook.
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George Lober retired as a senior lecturer from the De-
fense Analysis department of the US Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) in 2016. Prior to his retirement, he initi-
ated and taught a course in Critical Thinking and Ethical 
Decision Making.
Ambassador Feisal Amin Rasoul al-Istrabadi grew 
up in both the United States and Iraq. He received his 
JD from the Indiana University (IU) School of Law in 
1988, and LLM and SJD degrees from Northwestern 
University. After returning to Iraq, Istrabadi helped draft 
Iraq's Transitional Administrative Law and served as 
legal advisor to the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs. In 
2004, al-Istrabadi was appointed Ambassador, Deputy 
Permanent Representative of Iraq to the UN. He returned 
to the United States in 2007, where he now serves as 
an Associate Director of the Center for Constitutional 
Democracy at IU School of Law, and is the founding 
director of IU's Center for the Study of the Middle East. 
In 2015, al-Istrabadi was elected as a member of the 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
US Army Master Sergeant David “Ty” Long is a 
Senior Enlisted Advisor for the Department of Defense. 
He earned his MS degree from NPS, where he created and 
developed the strategic game CyberWar: 2025, based on 
his thesis research. He has published “Wargaming and the 
Educational Gap: Why CyberWar: 2025 was Created” in 
the Spring 2020 issue of The Cyber Defense Review. Long 
is also a senior software engineer and cyber researcher for 
the US Department of Defense.
Major Daniel Meegan is a US Army Special Forces 
officer. After commissioning in the infantry, he served at 
the Joint Multi-National Readiness Center in Germany 
and in Afghanistan with the Romanian-American 
Battlegroup. He has deployed multiple times throughout 
the Middle East, and is currently pursuing a Master’s 
degree in Defense Analysis from NPS. Major Meegan 
is a recipient of the Department of the Army’s General 
Douglas MacArthur Leadership Award.
Ian Rice is a retired US military officer who has served in 
a variety of overseas assignments at the tactical, opera-
tional, and strategic levels, most notably in Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and Korea. His most recent assignment in Iraq 
was with the United States' Diplomatic Mission to Iraq, 
where he served as director of the Tribal Engagement 
Coordination Cell during Operation Inherent Resolve.
Dr. Glenn E. Robinson is a professor of Defense Anal-
ysis at NPS and is affiliated with the Center for Middle 
East Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. 
He joined NPS in 1991, where he specializes in Middle 
East studies, social movement, US Middle Eastern policy, 
and political violence and jihad. Dr. Robinson earned 
his MA (1988) and PhD (1992) in political science from 
UC Berkeley. He has written several books on the Middle 
East and the Palestinians; his latest book, Global Jihad: 
A Brief History, is forthcoming in November 2020 from 
Stanford University Press.
Major Nate M. Smith is a career pilot with the United 
States Air Force Special Operations Command. He is cur-
rently studying Irregular Warfare in the Defense Analysis 
department at NPS. He is a graduate of the US Air Force 
Weapons School and has deployed in support of multiple 
contingency operations in Africa and the Middle East.
Dr. Craig Whiteside is a professor of theater security 
decision making for the Naval War College Monterey. 
He earned a PhD in political science from Washington 
State University, where he also taught American gov-
ernment and national security affairs. His dissertation 
investigated the political worldview of the Islamic State 
of Iraq (2003–2013). Dr. Whiteside served as an infantry 
officer in the US Army and is an Iraq war veteran. He is a 
graduate of the US Military Academy and the US Army 
Command and General Staff College.
The author of "What Special Operation Forces Might 
Learn from the Police: Three Observations" is a major 




 A commemorative ceremony held for Qassem Soleimani, commander 
of Iranian Revolutionary Guards' Quds Forces, who was killed in a 
US airstrike in Iraq, in Tehran, Iran, on 9 January 2020. (Photo by 
IRANIAN SUPREME LEADER PRESS OFFICE / HANDOUT/
Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)
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AT AROUND 11 O’CLOCK IN THE MORNING ON 18 MARCH 
2019, a fellow Marine and I were running through the woods near our base 
in the Netherlands, chatting as we ran. It was warm, beautiful weather and we 
had a lot to talk about because we had not spoken to each other for some time. 
Suddenly, my cell phone rang. There was an “alarm” notice on the screen. I 
listened to the voicemail, which told me that there had been a terrorist attack in 
Utrecht, the city where I live.1 I said to my colleague, “They forgot to say, ‘This is 
an exercise.’” However, it was not an exercise. A terrorist had just shot and killed 
three people in a tram and wounded several more.
At that time, I was the squadron commander of a SOF domestic counterter-
rorism unit that operated as part of a joint endeavor between the Dutch 
National Police and the military. In the Netherlands, this joint unit leads the 
domestic fight against both high-impact crime and terrorism. It is, as far as I 
know, a unique kind of national security cooperation, in which police and mili-
tary personnel operate together on a daily basis under police command, drawing 
on and integrating institutional qualities from both organizations. Integration 
can be a challenging process at times, but it has also provided valuable insights 
for both organizations. Although the operational environment and context of 
police and SOF work differ in many ways, I believe that any SOF unit that works 
in counterterrorism may learn something useful from the Dutch experience.
Special forces, as a branch of the military, train and work-up for most of the year 
and may be deployed abroad for months on high-risk assignments. When they 
arrive in their area of operations, their local network connections, situational 
What Special Operations 
Forces Might Learn 
from the Police:  
Three Observations
by Major, Royal Netherlands Marine Corps
The Department of Special 
Interventions’ integration 
of military and police units 
goes further than it does 
elsewhere.
On 18 March 2019, a member of the 
Netherlands' special police forces patrols 
in Utrecht, near a tram where a gunman 
opened fire, killing at least three persons 
and wounding several in what officials said 
was a possible terrorist incident.
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awareness, and time to sort effects tend to be limited. The 
police, in contrast, train only occasionally, and they operate 
daily in areas where they often have worked and even lived 
for years, and where they may belong to extensive profes-
sional and social networks. Police operations almost always 
have lower levels of risk than typical SOF operations. In 
this respect, the Dutch SOF units learn from their police 
colleagues what it takes to operate successfully within 
your own country, in your own city, and sometimes even 
on your own street. The police, for their part, learn from 
the SOF how to plan, coordinate, and conduct nationwide 
counterterrorist operations in which multiple suspects 
have to be arrested at the same time. 
In this essay, I make some observations regarding signature 
management, interagency collaboration, and hyper-
enabled units, and briefly discuss the potential application 
of each one in SOF operations. 
The Dutch Joint Counterterrorism Endeavor 
Since 1972, a unit within the Royal Netherlands Marine 
Corps has had responsibility for domestic counterter-
rorism. This dedicated CT unit has gone through several 
restructurings and name changes since its founding; 
currently, it is one of the operational squadrons of the 
Netherlands Maritime Special Operations Forces (NL-
MARSOF). Although it is a military SOF unit under the 
command of the Dutch Ministry of Defense, during 
domestic operations the unit works under the command 
of the police as part of the joint Department of Special 
Interventions (DSI), which apprehends suspects in signifi-
cant police investigations and responds to terror attacks, 
such as the terror attack in Utrecht. It is somewhat similar 
to the joint models used in other Western European 
countries, but the DSI’s integration of military and police 
units goes further than it does elsewhere. For example, 
the operators of the NLMARSOF squadron wear military 
uniforms when they are at their base, but they wear police 
uniforms during operations. Many of the NLMARSOF 
operators have an unmarked duty car in which they store 
their weapons and equipment while they are off duty, just 
as the police officers do. Also, the operators have identifica-
tion cards for both organizations and are fully integrated 
with police officers in small teams for everyday operations. 
In a typical career within NLMARSOF, operators rotate 
jobs every two to three years on average, which results in 
a good mix of experience throughout the unit. They are 
encouraged to spend a rotation with the DSI, and also on 
the international-focused squadron, the training squadron, 
and the NLMARSOF staff. 
Three Observations from Working in the DSI
My work in the DSI has shown me that certain aspects of 
the way police operate may have some value for SOF. Three 
in particular stand out: the importance of being able to 
rapidly change a unit’s signature in a way that adds value 
to the overall mission; “slowing down” job rotations so 
that personnel can build relationships in the communities 
where they are operating; and integrating a team of ana-
lysts into the unit so that the real-time “hyper” number of 
Police forces and emergency services investigate a shooting at the 24 Oktoberplein in Utrecht on 18 March 2019.
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data streams coming in during an operation are converted 
into one operational and actionable picture.
Signature Management 
To do their work of maintaining public order and en-
forcing laws, the police, on the one hand, have to be visible 
on the streets. On the other hand, they must not be visible 
during operations such as surveillance and infiltration, 
so signature management is an essential aspect of police 
work. Even so, in my experience, the DSI assumes that 
both its SOF and regular police operators will become 
visible at some point; operators know that they can be 
filmed and live-streamed on television at any moment.2 
In some instances, videos show the actual procedures of 
the teams in near-real time on TV or social media.3 The 
video footage is often rebroadcast over and over again in 
compilations by news agencies.4 In the Utrecht terrorist 
case, the mayor of the city directed all citizens to stay 
inside buildings.5 The streets were empty, which meant 
that the unmarked vehicles of the DSI could easily be 
spotted by the news agencies and live-streamed on Dutch 
and international television.6  
As a result, DSI operators are very aware that they must be 
able to explain and justify every step they take during their 
work. As an organization, the DSI proactively prepares 
media statements and monitors social media to respond 
instantly to physical or digital visibility, and tries to con-
nect a particular action or operation to a higher purpose.7  
This could be the overarching purpose of a safe and secure 
country in the case of terrorism, for instance, or one more 
directly tangible to viewers, such as the safety of their city 
or province. For example, if a drug network that caused a 
lot of local violence is taken down, the official statement re-
garding that operation might directly refer to the violence 
and the goal of restoring safe streets. 
The purpose of the Utrecht operation was clear to the 
public. However, associated activities that were taking 
place simultaneously in other parts of the country, such 
as tracking down leads to potential accomplices, were not 
intended to be visible. During these activities, the DSI units 
applied stealth tactics, blending into the local pattern of 
Netherlands Maritime Special Operations Forces
DSI operators are very aware that 
they must be able to explain and justify 
every step they take during their work.
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life so as not to attract attention and possibly alert poten-
tial suspects. 
SOF units might learn something from the police about 
how to rapidly change the unit’s signature within one 
operation. During domestic operations, SOF units experi-
ence considerable freedom of movement and few, if any, 
cultural differences within their operating environment. I 
do not advocate that Western SOF units on a strike mission 
try to blend into the local population of Afghanistan or 
Iraq, for example. That would, obviously, be impossible. 
However, the world is shifting toward a form of Great 
Power competition that seems likely to bring an increase 
in clandestine SOF operations in the grey zone. In some of 
these environments, SOF units might be better off if they 
are able to constantly and consciously assess their signature 
and adjust to the situations they encounter. As a result, 
they might need to operate like the DSI: visibly in one area 
but covertly in another. 
Interagency Collaboration 
Police need to collaborate with numerous other govern-
mental organizations daily in the course of their work. In 
the Netherlands, I have noticed that those collaborations 
are often based on long-lasting relationships and personal 
trust. As noted earlier, members of the police have a 
geographical advantage because of the fact that they typi-
cally live and work in the same area. Therefore, it is easier 
for officers to build long-lasting relationships with officials 
that enhance interagency cooperation. Furthermore, both 
the police and these other organizations have relatively 
few staff changes, which means that members are able to 
form durable ties both among individuals and between 
their agencies. Both sides seem to rely heavily on these 
established social networks to do their jobs. At the time of 
the terrorist attack, members of the Utrecht police, justice 
department, and city government knew each other well 
and had often worked together in previous emergencies 
or crises. In fact, it is typical for leaders of the respective 
agencies throughout the Netherlands to hold joint press 
conferences to emphasize their shared leadership.8 The 
bonds and trust that Utrecht officials had formed earlier 
helped enormously when they needed to share information 
and collaborate after the shooting on the tram. 
In contrast to the close relationships between the police 
and other government agencies, the military’s assignment 
rotation system often prevents the development of the 
necessary personal relationships that make interagency 
work effective. SOF personnel, as in many military units, 
rotate jobs every two to three years as a means to enhance 
individual growth and leadership. As an institution, SOF 
seem to rely heavily on the “organizational machine” that 
produces leaders rather than on a strategy of building long-
term relationships. I do not suggest that SOF should step 
away from the focus on individual growth and leadership 
and adopt the local police model, but a golden mean might 
lie between the two cultures. Slowing down the speed 
of SOF rotations might not only enable personal growth 
but also promote valuable intra- and inter-organizational 
relationships, and thus facilitate interagency cooperation.
Hyper-Enabled Units 
The police have an existing and dense network of enablers, 
such as traffic cameras, investigation teams, and citizen 
contact. In military terminology, this kind of network is 
“hyper-enabling.” At first glance, the initial development of 
such an information system might seem to be the primary 
challenge to creating hyper-enabled responses. In my 
experience, however, the real problem for the police lies in 
assessing all the data that comes in from such a network. 
In the Utrecht case, I arrived at the main police command 
post about 45 minutes after receiving the alert on my 
phone and saw that the police still had no clear picture of 
what had happened and what was happening. The staff 
were overwhelmed by phone calls, social media postings, 
and information coming in from officers on the street, but 
I also noted that the police analysts were closely focused on 
validating the often contradictory data. To do so, they took 
a step back and asked more questions, such as: “What was 
the very first call? What does the log of that call say? Who 
labeled this as terrorism and why? What other informa-
tion are we sure is true?” Over the course of that day, I 
experienced how an operational picture was built based on 
the information from all those enablers and by additional 
methods such as, for example, sending units to visit citizens 
who claimed to have witnessed other shootings in order 
to assess that information firsthand. The effect of being 
hyper-enabled is having access to, and the support of, 
massive amounts of real-time data. Although this leads to 
a lot of information “noise,” it also provides an invaluable 
opportunity to cross-validate the information, reject what 
can’t be verified, and, subsequently, act on that validated 
information. In Utrecht, it soon became clear that the 
terrorist had escaped, and so we began a manhunt.
The military’s rotation system often 
prevents the development of personal 
relationships that make interagency  
work effective.
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Currently, the US Special Operations Command is taking 
the first steps towards creating a hyper-enabled SOF 
operator.9 These initiatives seem to focus on bringing data 
from an array of enablers to the operator, the idea being 
that a hyper-enabled operator can outthink his opponent.10 
Based on my experiences, I suggest that SOF commands 
build on their military institutional expertise of creating 
and implementing structures so that, in addition to 
increasing the number of enablers and the amount of data 
coming in, they establish an analysis system that cross-
validates and assesses data before it gets to a unit, let alone 
to the individual operator.
Take, for example, the anecdotal case of a hostage situation 
on a ship that is anchored near the Somali coast. In this 
situation, a SOF unit is on standby to respond instantly and 
release the hostages. This SOF unit has only a few enablers, 
including a cell of negotiators, snipers with a clear view of 
the ship, communications interception, and a drone over-
head to relay video. In the current era, these are a common 
set of enablers that generate essential real-time data. Gener-
ally, these data streams are directly shared with the SOF 
unit through its commander. This raw data: however, often 
produces contradictory information that has to be assessed 
by the SOF unit. For instance, the negotiators may feel that 
the Somali spokesman is calmly cooperating, whereas the 
snipers report people making aggressive movements in the 
cabin with the hostages. Furthermore, the communications 
interception reports telephone calls in which screaming 
people can be heard in the background. 
These are only a few examples of enablers that produce 
contradictory information. As a rule, the more enabled 
a unit is, the more data streams exist and the more con-
flicting information a SOF unit receives. Hence, merely 
adding sensors and striving to hyper-enable operators 
would not necessarily help the SOF unit in the hostage 
scenario to clarify the situation on the ship, but might 
rather overload the unit with possibly contradictory infor-
mation and lead to a wrong decision. An obvious solution 
would be to have all these data streams interpreted by 
analysts and merged into a tactical assessment that is only 
then transparently shared with the SOF unit. However, 
in my experience, the current analytical capacity seems to 
be geared more toward longer-term strategic reports that 
are well-thought through but take considerable time to 
develop. What a SOF unit needs in a hostage situation such 
as the one described above are analysts who can interpret 
and integrate real-time data streams in rapidly developing 
and ambiguous situations. So, instead of focusing effort on 
hyper-enabling individual operators, I suggest that the first 
step is to hyper-enable SOF units by training an element 
of analysts to assess and cross-validate data from a “hyper” 
number of enablers while working in active, rapidly 
developing, ambiguous crisis situations. 
Conclusion
The Dutch have a working concept for domestic counter-
terrorism in which SOF and police are integrated in the 
Larger countries may also benefit  
from the Dutch experience.
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Department of Special Interventions and operate jointly 
under police command. These combined SOF and police 
units operate daily on the streets of the Netherlands’s cities. 
While the integration process has not been without chal-
lenges, both organizations contribute to the success of the 
joint venture with their unique institutional qualities. At 
first glance, the integration of SOF and police may seem to 
be a realistic option only for smaller nation-states. Al-
though smaller states tend to have smaller institutions, the 
differences between the institutional aspects of SOF and 
police organizations, such as their human resources and 
benefits systems, appear to be of similar scale whatever the 
size of the country. Thus, larger countries may also benefit 
from the Dutch experience.
The terrorist attack in Utrecht was a crisis that not only re-
ceived national and global media coverage but also showed 
the value of the joint concept, as its operators responded 
rapidly, effectively, and decisively. How does this story end? 
Due to the DSI’s experience with signature management, 
its long-term relationships with other agencies and local 
governments, and its ability to manage hyper-enabled data 
streams, it was able to resolve the terrorist crisis the same 
day that I received the alarm on my cell phone. Thanks to 
surveillance cameras on the tram, we learned the identity 
of the attacker in about two hours. When we arrested him 
three hours after that, we could positively identify him 
through the facial images taken from that video.11 He was 
tried in court and received a life sentence.12   
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The purpose of this essay is to introduce special operators to the concept of “move-
ments of rage,” a distinctive form of violent sociopolitical movement that does not 
fit well into the common categories of terrorism, fourth wave religious terrorism, 
new terrorism, cosmic war, or other existing definitions of forms of political 
violence. Movements of rage are typically small and inchoate movements that 
rarely come to power, but that incorporate justifications of profound violence and 
apocalyptic ideologies that can be religious or secular. The concept of movements of 
rage was first described by UC Berkeley scholar Ken Jowitt.1 I refine and expand the 
concept in my new book, Global Jihad: A Brief History.2 
By looking at examples of movements of rage, we can begin to see why they are 
not easily pigeonholed into existing categories and definitions. Movements of rage 
have emerged out of Maoist, Fascist, Islamist, and other ideological traditions. 
Perhaps the most well-known example were the Khmer Rouge, who ruled Cam-
bodia from 1975 to 1979 and presided over a genocide of up to two million souls. 
This Maoist offshoot glorified an imagined Khmer history based on a model of 
simple peasantry. Who were the enemies who deserved brutal re-education at the 
least and, in many cases, summary execution? The educated. Cambodians who 
spoke a European language, who wore European clothing, or even who wore eye-
glasses, which denoted the ability to read, were targeted for execution or exile to 
labor in the countryside. These educated elites were seen by Khmer Rouge leaders 
as a cultural “fifth column” who brought cultural contamination of the pure Khmer 
agrarian life into Cambodia.3 Indeed, one of the first actions of the Khmer Rouge 
when they seized power was to empty the capital city, Phnom Penh, of its inhabit-
ants, because this was the place where such contaminating elites lived. Virtually 
Movements of Rage
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Virtually overnight, 
Phnom Penh became a 
ghost town, as many of its 
residents were marched 
to the killing fields.
Skulls of those killed by the Khmer Rouge 
at Cambodia's Choeung Ek Memorial
13Summer 2020
overnight, Phnom Penh became a ghost town, as many of its 
residents were marched to the killing fields outside of town, 
never to be seen again. This purposeful destruction of the 
country’s “best and brightest,” represented what I have called 
a gnosicide—the killing or violent marginalization of the 
educated stratum, of those with knowledge.
This form of state terror does not emerge naturally from 
Maoist thought and does not fit into any of the usual 
categories of violence noted above. The Khmer practiced 
violence that was nihilistic: not meaningless, but what could 
be called “root-and-branch” violence, out of all proportion to 
any legitimate strategic goals. Their ideology was apocalyptic, 
based on the belief that a sort of non-religious End Times 
was upon them and that the violent elimination of the 
sources of cultural contamination was essential to make way 
for their agrarian utopia. Their leadership—many, ironically, 
educated in France—did not come from the traditional his-
toric leadership stratum of Cambodia, but rather from more 
marginal groups and families, particularly provincial elites. 
Very few studies of political violence try to make sense of this 
extraordinary episode; most, instead, classify it as an example 
of state-directed genocide. While that is a true depiction, it 
does not go far enough in putting the Khmer Rouge into a 
broader comparative perspective.
The Khmer Rouge did not have far to look to find an 
exemplar of a Maoist offshoot that undertook a remarkably 
similar gnosicide consisting of a murderous attack on a 
culturally polluting educated stratum: the Red Guards of 
China. The Red Guards emerged autonomously in 1966 
in the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, Mao’s attempt to 
regain the authority that he had lost through his disastrous 
“Great Leap Forward” program, which had killed millions of 
citizens and seriously damaged China’s economic progress. 
The young Red Guards saw an opportunity to operationalize 
Mao’s criticism of “bourgeois tendencies” inflicted on China 
by capitalist infiltrators and corrupters. They set out to attack 
and murder Chinese intellectuals—those with knowledge. 
At the height of the Red Guards’ reign of terror, from 1966 
to 1968, thousands of intellectuals, including schoolteachers 
and scholars, were killed or beaten. Mao, seeing the power 
and devotion in these young protégés, promoted their vision 
and their leaders. Indeed, beyond accepting the wanton 
murder and destruction of cultural institutions by the Red 
Guards, Mao implemented two policies of gnosicide that 
came out of the Red Guards’ ideology: the closure of all 
schools and universities from 1966 to 1972 (and some even 
longer), and the agrarian “re-education” of high school and 
university graduates from Beijing in the “Down to the Coun-
tryside” campaign, which resulted in hundreds of thousands 
more deaths. While exact figures are hard to come by, about 
as many people died in the Red Guards’ orgy of violence as 
did a decade later in Cambodia. 
The very name Boko Haram translates to 
“education is forbidden.”
But examples of movements of rage are found beyond the 
Maoist world. Some extremist Islamist and jihadi groups 
have also practiced similar gnosicide. For example, in its 
origins, the Nigerian group Boko Haram was a prototypical 
movement of rage. Its very name translates to “education is 
forbidden”—the education system inherited from British 
colonial days being viewed as a source of cultural contamina-
tion.4 Boko Haram’s violence has mostly targeted schools and 
the students being educated in them. Most notoriously, in 
April 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped 276 schoolgirls from a 
school in Chibok, Nigeria. Some were executed; a few were 
released; but most were involuntarily “married” to Boko 
Haram fighters and were not heard from again. Boko Ha-
ram’s leaders later pledged loyalty to ISIS. The Taliban, who 
held power in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, are another 
example of a movement of rage; they viewed Kabul as the 
capital of cultural corruption and tried to ban all Western 
Red Guards with Mao
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influences. Anything that was seen as foreign knowledge was 
removed from the classroom, and all education was prohib-
ited to females. Music was banned and beards were made 
mandatory for men. The Taliban’s austere totalitarianism, 
rooted in rural and provincial mores and resentments, was 
not dissimilar to the agrarian nirvana envisioned by the 
Khmer Rouge.  
The most famous examples of global jihad groups, such as 
al Qaeda and ISIS, are also manifestations of an Islamist 
version of movements of rage. In both cases, their violence 
was nihilistic and their ideologies apocalyptic. Al Qaeda is 
most infamous for its 11 September 2001 terror attacks on 
the United States that killed nearly 3,000 innocent civilians. 
But even before then, in a 1998 statement, Osama bin Laden 
and other al Qaeda leaders had called for the murder of all 
Americans and Jews, civilian or military, anywhere in the 
world. This brazen demand for the execution of 350 million 
souls is the very definition of nihilistic root-and-branch 
violence. ISIS categorized not only non-Muslim “infidels” 
(kuffar) and “rejectionist” (rafidun) Shia as collectively 
warranting death, but also, essentially, even pious Sunni 
Muslims who did not agree with the ISIS program. The gore 
and ghoulishness with which ISIS undertook the execution 
of its enemies were filmed and uploaded online for the world 
to witness. The apocalyptic nature of ISIS’s ideology was very 
evident, as Will McCants captured in his aptly named book, 
The ISIS Apocalypse.5 Attacks on education were also common 
in the ISIS “Caliphate,” where girls were typically not allowed 
any education and jihadi ideology replaced actual knowledge 
in what passed for a curriculum in ISIS schools.
Like Maoism, Fascism has a tendency to 
spawn or attract movements of rage.
Fascism, like Maoism, is not in and of itself a movement 
of rage, but, again like Maoism, Fascism has a tendency to 
spawn or attract movements of rage. Germany’s Brownshirts, 
an important early component of the Nazi movement, were 
the best-known example of a movement of rage attached to 
a Fascist movement. The Brownshirts (or Sturmabteilung, 
literally Storm Detachment), were semi-literate, lower middle 
class workers from mostly rural origins who acted as a 
militia of thugs and protectors of the Nazis in the 1920s and 
1930s. Once the Nazis were firmly in power and no longer 
needed the poorly organized and trained Brownshirts, Hitler 
ordered them purged from the coalition in 1934, during an 
event known as the Night of the Long Knives. The Brown-
shirts, like others in the Nazi coalition, fully embraced the 
doctrine of cultural contamination by impure groups—Jews, 
Gypsies, gays, the disabled—and sought not just the ritual 
removal of these groups from the pure Ayran nation, but 
their actual physical destruction. Education was one indi-
cator of such cultural contamination, so book burning was a 
common occurrence under Nazi rule.
Not all White Nationalists constitute a movement of rage, 
but many do. Like the Brownshirts before them, many White 
Nationalists do not have college degrees, come from rural 
areas, and blame “coastal” and other elites for the cultural 
contamination of an imagined once-pure society. In Europe 
and the United States, White Nationalists find such cultural 
contamination primarily in the form of non-white immigra-
tion. They also find cultural contamination in fifth-column 
elements who threaten the purity of white society; this was 
the meaning of the infamous chant at the 2017 White Na-
tionalist Unite the Right Rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, 
that “Jews will not replace us.” While gnosicide in some form 
has not occurred to date in the United States, it is significant 
that, of Republican Party members and independents who 
lean Republican, nearly twice as many view colleges and 
universities negatively as view them positively—a trend that 
is rapidly spreading.6 White Nationalist acts of mass violence 
have been directed against the impure immigrant popula-
tions (e.g., attacks in Christchurch, New Zealand, and El 
Paso, Texas), impure fifth columnists (e.g., attacks on Jews in 
synagogues in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Poway, Cali-
fornia), and the liberal elites who make it all possible (e.g., the 
2011 attack on a liberal political summer camp in Norway 
that killed 77 people, mostly children).
Having established the similarity of some very violent 
political movements across different cultural and political 
settings, let us move to precisely defining movements of rage, 
and to establish why they constitute a unique form of violent 
political movement. A movement of rage is a distinctive 
Alt-right members preparing to enter Emancipation Park holding 
Nazi, Confederate, and Gadsden Don't Tread on Me flags at the 
'Unite the Right' Rally, Charlottesville, Virginia, USA.
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violent sociopolitical movement that is characterized by three 
elements:
•   nihilistic violence;
•   apocalyptic, anti-Enlightenment ideology;
•   charismatic leadership.
Let me address each of these characteristics in turn. The 
word “nihilism” is critical to understanding movements 
of rage, but can be confusing because it has two different 
meanings. Nihilism has a philosophical meaning based on 
the Latin word nihil, or “nothing,” and refers primarily to 
a nineteenth and twentieth century movement of Existen-
tialism founded by Danish theologian and philosopher Soren 
Kierkegaard (1813–1855). Existentialism holds that there is 
no intrinsic meaning in life, so that life is literally meaning-
less. This challenged both religious interpretations of life as 
having a broader meaning through God, and philosophical 
interpretations that likewise posited some grander meaning 
to life beyond biological existence. Existentialism spawned 
movements in the worlds of art, philosophy, and literature, 
and its advocates include famous names such as Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Jean-Paul 
Sartre, and Albert Camus. Those thinking in Existential 
terms would believe that nihilistic violence is “meaningless 
violence.” But this is not so. However abhorrent, no politi-
cally motivated act of violence is meaningless; there is always 
a point to it. Those acts of violence that really are meaning-
less are not political. For example, Stephen Paddock’s sniper 
attack on a country music festival in Las Vegas, Nevada, 
in 2017, which left 60 people dead and hundreds injured, 
appears to have been a meaningless act of violence. Paddock 
was not part of any political group that we know of, and left 
behind neither a video nor a written statement of why he 
was about to murder many strangers. It appears that he set 
out to murder people simply for his own entertainment, and 
not for some cause (however deranged). So the Las Vegas 
shooting appears to have been meaningless violence in the 
philosophical (Existential) sense of the word. This form of 
mass murder is very rare indeed.
However abhorrent, no politically moti-
vated act of violence is meaningless.
Far more common is mass murder undertaken under the 
second, political meaning of nihilism; that is, extreme 
violence done to destroy a whole society, a system, root and 
branch. This use of the word nihilism was also a nineteenth 
century invention, in this case to refer to the writings of the 
Russian anarchist Mikhail Bakunin. Bakunin and his fellow 
anarchists wanted to bring down the whole corrupt system 
in Moscow through extreme violence; they did not advocate 
utilizing violence with some sense of surgical precision for a 
specific goal. So nihilistic violence in the political sense came 
to mean extreme violence, not meaningless violence. All of 
the violence noted in my examples above is evidence of either 
actual extreme violence, such as that undertaken by the 
Khmer Rouge, or ideological justifications for extreme vio-
lence, such as that of al Qaeda. But in none of these cases has 
the violence been meaningless. Its perpetrators have always 
had political goals they sought to achieve: some nirvana they 
believed they were willing into existence.
As Marxism evolved into Leninism and 
then Maoism in places, it promised mate-
rial advancement, equality, and greater 
social justice. 
If nihilistic violence is the first characteristic of a movement 
of rage, then an apocalyptic, anti-Enlightenment ideology 
is a second characteristic, and that ideology will always have 
cultural contamination as a feature. The ideology of a move-
ment of rage is distinct from virtually all violent sociopo-
litical movements over the past century. The vast majority of 
all violent movements in the modern era have depended on 
an Enlightenment ideology, be it Communism on the Left, 
national liberation from the Center, or Fascism on the Right. 
Karl Marx and the Communists he inspired believed in the 
scientific march of history: that history was not a series of 
random events (as Existentialists would argue), but rather, 
that it unfolded in a systematic, scientific, and predictable 
fashion. Most importantly, this historical march led at each 
step of the way to a better society. While Joseph Schumpeter 
coined the phrase "creative destruction,” it was Karl Marx 
who argued that capitalism—and its associated creative 
destruction—was a remarkably vibrant economic system that 
was superior to the feudal system it replaced. As Marxism 
St. Peter’s Square, Rome
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evolved into Leninism and then Maoism in places, it took 
power in many countries and promised material advance-
ment, equality, and greater social justice: in other words, the 
forward march of history.  
The national liberation movements of the twentieth century 
were also based on Enlightenment ideals, with the promise 
that their victories would bring liberty and freedom to 
colonized and oppressed peoples throughout Africa and 
Asia. Shedding European domination was also a step in 
the forward march of history. These national liberation 
movements were an obvious extension of the Enlightenment 
ideals embodied in the earlier revolutions in France, Britain, 
and America.
Even Fascism was based on the Enlightenment ideal of 
material progress, or, in Mussolini’s famous phrasing, “to 
make the trains run on time.” The huge monuments and 
wide boulevards built and planned to be built in Italy and 
Germany under Fascist rule were testimony to the greatness 
of their peoples and the advance of civilization under their 
rule. Even the Vatican was not spared the symbolic greatness 
of Italian Fascism when Mussolini personally allowed the 
destruction of the intimate Spina neighborhood to create a 
giant boulevard leading up to Saint Peter’s Square.
Movements of rage are backward-looking, 
usually to some imagined  
golden era when life and society 
were at their best.
Movements of rage do not turn to the Enlightenment for 
their inspiration. They are instead backward-looking, usually 
to some imagined golden era when life and society were at 
their best. Although they were Maoists, Khmer Rouge leader 
Pol Pot and the Khmer leadership looked to the early Khmer 
empire (late ninth century to early fifteenth century) as their 
golden era to emulate. ISIS, Boko Haram, and other jihadi 
movements of rage look to the time of Muhammad and his 
first four successors as that imagined perfect period in his-
tory they seek to recreate. White Nationalists in the United 
States often look to the imagined 1950s as their lodestar, 
when blacks, women, Latinos, gays, and other cultural con-
taminants of white patriarchal society were mostly hidden 
from view.  
While movements of rage look back, not forward, to the 
apex of history, their ideologies also feature a strong element 
of cultural contamination, which goes a long way toward 
explaining why those “best days” are always behind them. 
Cultural contamination tends to include two qualities: 
the physical manifestations of cultural corruption and the 
fifth columnists who make it possible. For both the Khmer 
Rouge and extreme jihadis, it is the West that is the source 
of cultural contamination. It was the West that ruined pure 
Khmer society and the West that corrupted Islam and the 
Muslim world. Thus, attacks against the West are justified 
and encouraged in order to stop the scourge of further con-
tamination. For White Nationalists today, it is the non-white 
immigrant population that bears the brunt of the cultural 
contamination accusations. At the same time, fifth colum-
nists—educated elites—within pure society are also targeted 
as being vectors for contamination. This is why the Khmer 
and the Red Guard targeted and often murdered anyone 
who had the mark of advanced education; this is why most of 
the people ISIS killed were not Westerners, but rather those 
Muslims who were considered the bearers of contamination; 
this is why White Nationalists constantly verbally, and some-
times physically, attack the liberal elites who support policies 
of cultural contamination. This is why, when they come to 
power, movements of rage commit gnosicide, terrorizing 
those with knowledge because, through their knowledge, 
these elites corrupt the pure, idealized society.
Finally, and not surprisingly, movements of rage tend to 
have charismatic leadership. The charismatic leader—almost 
always a man—is awe-inspiring, endowed by his followers 
with the attributes of a god (the word charisma is originally 
religious in meaning). Charismatic leaders ask their followers 
to do hard things in the name of their cause, and often 
have an aura of prophecy about them. Both Mao and Iran’s 
Ayatollah Khomeini led social revolutions and succeeded 
against long odds, and both asked their followers to risk 
their lives for the cause. Even though Mao was a secular 
charismatic leader, he was often thought to hold a “Mandate 
of Heaven” (tian ming). Khomeini was often whispered to 
be the returning twelfth imam who had been in occultation 
for over a millennium (al-imam al-gha’ ib). Neither of these 
revolutions was a movement of rage, but both point to the 
centrality of hard, demanding, charismatic leadership for 
Hitler salutes Brownshirts
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any such movement to actually come to power. But what sets 
the charismatic leadership found in movements of rage apart 
from that found in other types of sociopolitical movements 
is the marginal or provincial origins of the leaders. These are 
men (and it is always men in movements of rage) who are 
not familiar in the halls of power, do not come from elite 
families, did not grow up in the capital city, and did not go 
to the best private schools money could buy. Typically, they 
hail from the provinces, are smart and did well in school, but 
were never allowed entry into the intimate circles of national 
power and wealth. They may even be provincial governors or 
mayors, and often come from families that are locally promi-
nent but not at the national level. Their rage is frequently 
personal, emanating from what they perceive as their unjust 
exclusion from national elite status.
Movements of rage are typically weak and almost never 
come to power. Their resort to excessive violence and their 
inchoate, backward-looking ideologies do not appeal to very 
many people. Their leaders can be arrested or killed, which 
often devastates a nascent movement of rage. States’ ability to 
detect and deal with dissent has only grown stronger in the 
information age, making it even more unlikely now that a 
movement of rage will gain enough traction to move forward. 
That said, movements of rage are deadly. They aspire to kill 
a lot of people, particularly through communal cleansing of 
social contaminants. Where governments have ignored the 
growing threat of a movement of rage, as seems to be the case 
in the United States with regard to White Nationalism, they 
have invited much greater levels of violence and terror down 
the road.
Where governments have ignored the 
growing threat of a movement of rage, 
they have invited much greater levels of 
violence and terror down the road.
Special operators (and others) would do well to add the 
category of movements of rage to the types of deadly actors 
with whom they deal, and to distinguish movements of 
rage from other forms of violent groups that espouse terror. 
Understanding the distinctions between different forms 
of violent actors can make all the difference in the world 
when deciding how best to deal with those groups, and will 
increase the chances of success in doing so.
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Iraqi Ambassador to 
the United Nations
Interviewed by Dr. Craig Whiteside, 
US Naval War College 
and COL Ian Rice (Retired), US Army
ON 31 JANUARY 2020, THE NATIONAL Security 
Affairs department of the US Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) in Monterey, California, hosted Ambassador Feisal 
al-Istrabadi for a guest lecture with students and faculty. 
Afterward, he sat for an interview with Dr. Craig  
Whiteside and Colonel Ian Rice (Retired) to discuss the 
rise and fall of ISIS in Iraq and prospects for the future 
of the US-Iraqi relationship.1 Istrabadi is a former Iraqi 
ambassador to the United Nations (2004–2007) and 
is currently on the faculty of the University of Indiana’s 
Center for the Study of the Middle East. 
CRAIG WHITESIDE: You mentioned in an earlier lecture 
that you come from a family with a long background in 
Iraqi politics.
FEISAL AL-ISTRABADI: Yes. Although my parents were 
not political, the larger families on both sides were politi-
cally involved. My family goes back to the foundations of 
the modern state of Iraq. My paternal grandfather was a 
member of the Iraqi constituent assembly and perennially 
served as a senator.2 My maternal grandfather, who had 
been an Ottoman officer in the First World War, was the 
first superintendent of the Iraqi military academy in the 
1920s. He lasted only nine months as superintendent, 
however, because the defense minister, Jafar Pasha al-
Askari, who was one of the founders of the modern state 
of Iraq, appointed a British “advisor” to the academy and 
my grandfather resigned. He despised the British: he had 
fought against them in the war and didn’t want to be as-
sociated with a British advisor. Then he was elected to the 
first Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of Parliament, 
where he served for a time. My paternal grandfather served 
in the Senate and then became the inspector general of the 
Iraqi Ministry of Education. My father’s first cousin, an 
economist, was the minister of development in the 1940s 
and 1950s. So I come from a line of political figures and 
academics.3 
WHITESIDE: Does your family have any particular tribal 
affiliation? 
AL-ISTRABADI: We are not a tribe; al-Istrabadi is a family 
name. We’ve been in Baghdad for seven centuries. The 
story is that we’re De’zei on my mother’s side, which would 
make us Kurdish. My maternal grandfather was mostly 
Kurdish, although his mother was Arab. Whether you have 
lived in Iraq’s cities, as my family has for centuries, or in the 
tribal areas, we’re all highly intermarried, and I have Arab, 
Kurdish, Persian, and Turkman blood. Also, my father’s 
family are Shi’a and my mother’s family are Sunni. This is 
very common in Iraq.
WHITESIDE: In a professional military education course 
that I help teach at NPS, we have our students participate 
in a US National Security Council simulation. We try to 
give the students a current crisis to study, so they can see 
what it’s like to make decisions based on the same limited 
information that policy makers have. The topic we gave 
them this quarter (early 2020) was the looming confronta-
tion between the United States and Iran. One thing that 
the students struggled with was how to deter Iran from 
killing American soldiers, citizens, and contractors, such as 
the Iraqi-American who was killed in late December near 
Kirkuk. The students developed options in the simulation 
for a fictional president, but expressed little confidence that 
their ideas would work in the long run.
AL-ISTRABADI: With regard to the killing of Qassem 
Soleimani [commander of the Iranian Quds Force], the 
fears of imminent attack that were put forward as a legal 
justification for the killing appeared to dissipate, mostly for 
logical reasons.4 If an attack were imminent, you would not 
prevent that attack by decapitation. You would prevent an 
imminent attack by engaging with the force that was about 
to attack you before it actually attacked you. So that was 
always a hollow justification from a legal point of view. The 
only justification left is the notion that Soleimani’s death 
would deter the Iranians. I think that that is a vain hope 
because we’ve seen that in fact there was an immediate 
Iranian response. 
I favored entering the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
[JCPOA, commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal] at 
the time, and I still think that withdrawing from it was a 
mistake.5 I think the Obama administration would have 
done much better [than the current administration] in 
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engaging the Iranians diplomatically in other matters, as well. That would have 
been politically wise for the Iranians internally—assuming it succeeded—be-
cause such engagement would have addressed some of the criticism that was 
aimed at the Iranian leadership. The Iranians would have had an incentive to 
deal on some of the larger issues at least, such as refraining from either a direct 
confrontation with the United States or a proxy confrontation, and avoiding the 
targeting of US assets in the region. As it is, the United States chose to escalate 
with Iran, apparently without having a clear strategic objective, and then it be-
came an exchange of tit-for-tat responses. What was the strategic imperative and 
what was the strategic advantage for the United States in targeting Soleimani? I 
don’t question the legality of targeting him, but I do question the strategic value 
in having done so. What was gained?
WHITESIDE: Moreover, there is the problem of killing him inside Iraq.
AL-ISTRABADI: That was clearly and simply the wrong time and the wrong 
place. They could have done it a couple hours earlier, or over the deserts of 
Syria, and had some plausible deniability by claiming that it was a mechanical 
failure or whatever. That would have been one thing, but to have done it in 
Iraq, with Iraqi officials in the motorcade. . . . Not that I’m weeping any tears 
for Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, but his death created complications domesti-
cally within the Iraqi polity and also for the United States in terms of this clash 
between the United States and Iran.6 I think diplomacy is a good thing, and I 
don’t see any sort of US diplomatic effort or plan. In fact, the [Trump] admin-
istration is gutting the US diplomatic corps. I don’t see any direction for US 
A strong defense and a 
credible military deterrent 
have to be supported by 
strong diplomacy.
President Obama speaks on Iran Nuclear Deal.
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diplomacy to go with regard to Iran. That track seems to be 
wholly absent, and in its absence, I don’t know what might 
be a good deterrent. I don’t think the targeting of senior 
Iranian officials is going to be much of a deterrent, so I 
fundamentally don’t see a way out. 
WHITESIDE: That’s what the students in the NSC  
classroom simulation said. They could not solve this  
policy problem. 
AL-ISTRABADI: The only way forward is to engage diplo-
matically. The problem is that President Trump ratcheted 
up the tension so much. It’s interesting to see, because 
he ratcheted it up and then he immediately gave the 
Swiss president his cell phone number to give to [Iranian 
President Hassan] Rouhani. He’s begging the Iranians, 
“Call me.” Well, why not talk to them before you withdraw 
from an agreement that they were already abiding by? 
The JCPOA had many flaws and it was a legitimate thing 
to say, let’s see if we can improve the agreement and add 
another component, maybe expand on the strategic issues 
beyond the nuclear front. But simply to withdraw when 
the Iranians were abiding by it? What’s their incentive 
to negotiate? The approach was, I think, wrong. While I 
obviously believe in having a strong defense and a credible 
military deterrent, these have to be supported by strong 
diplomacy. Because without that, as the old saying goes, if 
the only tool you have is a hammer, every problem looks 
like a nail. 
IAN RICE: In 2016 and 2017, as the chief of the Tribal 
Engagement Coordination Cell at the US Embassy in 
Baghdad, my team and I strongly raised the alarm about 
the influence Iran was wielding through the al-Hashd 
al-Sha’abi [Popular Mobilization Forces, or PMF]. We 
considered trying to deter the Iranians by creating a wedge 
between the Iranian-backed al-Hashd al-Sha’abi and the 
Iraqi nationalists backed by Grand Ayatollah Sistani. In 
order to gain favor with the nationalists, the concept was 
for the United States to develop a relationship with the 
Sistani-backed militia groups and potentially provide them 
with security assistance, including training and materiel. 
The Sistani-backed militias are actually patriotic Iraqis 
looking to repair their state and defend their country, so it 
was an easy choice to develop a concept to support them 
and drive a wedge between them and the Iranian-backed 
proxies. The idea was to make the Sistani-backed groups 
into a patriotic example that could be emulated by the 
Iraqi populace and that would also set the militias apart 
from the Iranian groups. To accomplish this, however, 
required extensive negotiations with the various militia 
leaders and, because many were Iraqi nationalists, they 
were, understandably, anti-American. In your opinion, did 
this idea have any legs in terms of diplomatic measures? 
The concept came from a junior foreign service officer, and 
it seemed to be the most reasonable suggestion for deter-
rence that we had at the time. 
AL-ISTRABADI: That is a possible approach, although to 
succeed, it can’t be seen by Iraqis as an American idea. The 
United States could support such an approach but you 
would have to find Iraqi interlocutors who would be the 
ones to actually advance that agenda, and then the United 
States can come in quietly in support—and without 
tweeting about it. 
What we’ve had is this wholesale rape of 
the country by the political class in Iraq.
“Good governance” is a phrase we use whenever any 
problem arises, and I don’t want to be Pollyanna-ish about 
this, but I do think that if Iraq had had good governance, 
if we had had successive governments that were less 
corrupt, that would have cured a lot of Iraq’s ills. I’m not 
asking that the government be like Sweden, but maybe just 
Persian Gulf levels of corruption, where the elites and their 
children have really nice cars and nice second homes in 
London, but at the same time, they’re building hospitals, 
schools, and roads in their home countries and allowing 
commerce, so that a rising tide can lift all boats. That’s not 
ideal; I’d love to have the Swedish model of zero corrup-
tion but, realistically, I’m willing to tolerate some corrup-
tion in exchange for real services on the Gulf model. This, 
by the way, is what the Kurds are doing. There’s corruption 
in Iraqi Kurdistan but, at least in Erbil, there’s also building 
taking place, and some in Sulaymaniyah, too. I don’t mean 
that as an endorsement of corruption, but what we’ve had 
is this wholesale rape of the country by the political class 
in Iraq and nothing is being invested. Good governance 
includes a political class that uses the state’s assets to invest 
in the country, that encourages foreign investment and the 
development of a private sector. The current knee-jerk re-
sponse of the Iraqi government whenever there are protests 
about lack of jobs and lack of opportunity is to find ways 
to hire more people in the government sector. I think our 
public sector payments are something like $50 billion a 
year. That’s simply not sustainable as an economic model.
The support that some of these militias have is in part 
because they pay their fighters. And now they’re receiving 
government payments plus engaging in illicit activities, 
so they’re getting paid from both sides. Take away that 
monetary incentive to fight or that need to illegally 
support militia leadership and maybe you can drive those 
sorts of wedges between them. The religious authority has 
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made a basic error—a fundamental mistake, for me—in 
justifying the PMF. I don’t care what the Marajiyah [Shi’a 
religious authority] meant when it tried to claim that it 
didn’t mean to set up private militias, but meant people 
should go volunteer for the army or the police force. But it 
was too late by then. Abu-Mahdi al-Muhandis of Kata’ib 
Hezbollah and Hadi al-Amiri of Badr and Qais al-Khazali 
of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq had already been off and running, 
conducting operations well before Iraq’s central govern-
ment had established any control over them. So, Iraq has 
established these non-state actors on an equal footing with 
the state, on the Hezbollah model. Has anyone figured out 
how to deal with Hezbollah? Because if you figure that out, 
you’ll be able to figure out what to do in Iraq. It’s a very 
complicated problem.
RICE: Yes, we had experiences with some of the USAID 
[United States Agency for International Development 
]-funded NGOs [non-governmental organizations] in 
western Ninewa. They commented regularly that they 
worked with Kata’ib Hezbollah. This is the Lebanese Hez-
bollah model: use somebody else’s money to obtain and to 
provide services. That’s what Kata’ib Hezbollah was doing: 
getting someone to provide services for its operations. And 
we, Americans who were examining this issue, believed 
Nthis was the case because Kata’ib Hezbollah and other 
Iranian-backed groups had Lebanese Hezbollah advisors in 
addition to Iranian advisors. 
AL-ISTRABADI: I remember having this discussion with 
an American ambassador back in 2006, when I was still in 
New York. There was a war between Israel and Hezbollah, 
and she was saying, “These [Hezbollah] are terrorists.” 
I said, “I understand from your perspective and, maybe, 
from mine, that these are a bunch of terrorists, but look at 
it from the Lebanese perspective. The Israeli army bombs 
your village in Lebanon and destroys your house. The next 
day, a Hezbollah representative comes with $25,000 in 
cash—and this is $25,000 in some village in Lebanon, not 
in Manhattan where you can’t buy a brick for $25,000—
for you to rebuild your home. Whose side are you going 
to be on?” And she said, “Well, that’s all Iranian money.” I 
answered, “Do you think you’d care where the money came 
from?” So, I really think our policy makers think about 
these problems from the wrong perspective. 
RICE: Another great example of this was the fact that the 
Iranian-backed militias didn’t have any of the same vetting 
requirements that the Iraqi government-funded militias 
had to meet to bring in Sunni fighters. If you were an 
President Donald J. Trump signs a National Security Presidential Memorandum as he announces the withdrawal of 
the United States from the Iran Nuclear Deal.
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Iranian-backed militia, you could just give a Sunni fighter 
in Ninewa $500 a month, a gun, and a car. And that was 
all fine. If your militia was supported by Ninewa province’s 
mobilization committee and trained by Americans, then, 
oh my goodness, you had to go through all these gates 
to hire fighters, and it wasn’t even fair in terms of seeing 
the comparative advantage. I mean, if Kata’ib Hezbollah 
shows up at your doorstep and says, “Hey I’ll give you two 
choices: I’ll burn you out or I’ll give you $500, a weapon, 
and a car,” well, it’s a pretty easy choice. 
AL-ISTRABADI: I remember talking to [Coalition Provi-
sional Authority chief Paul] Bremer, at the time when the 
[anti-coalition] insurgency was getting going. People were 
already talking about the “Sunni triangle,” and I said “You 
know, Ambassador Bremer, the tribes and the tribal leaders 
didn’t love Saddam Hussein; he bought their loyalty with 
cash and brand new Chevy Suburbans,” and Bremer said, 
“We don’t do things that way.” Well, when [Commander of 
the Multinational Forces in Iraq General David] Petraeus 
and [US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan)] Crocker were in 
Baghdad, that’s exactly what they did. 
WHITESIDE: To reinforce your point, I myself [as a repre-
sentative of the US government] paid Sunni tribal auxilia-
ries in the south of Baghdad during the Surge in 2007. So, 
do you think this conflict between the United States and 
Iran in Iraq was always inevitable once the so-called Islamic 
State was defeated, at least militarily and politically? And 
are the Iranians, who, at least according to their narrative, 
pushed the United States out once before in 2011 and aim 
to repeat that feat again, going to pull this off ?
AL-ISTRABADI: No. You have to remember the history 
of these relationships. I want to say, “defeated” is a relative 
term. ISIS is obviously not destroyed. 
WHITESIDE: Defeat as a temporary condition?
AL-ISTRABADI: Precisely my point. ISIS is obviously 
reconstituting itself. I co-edited the book The Future Of 
ISIS: Regional and International Implications and wrote a 
chapter in which I talked about how ISIS would inevitably 
lose the territory they controlled and transform into a 
more traditional terrorist organization that launches the 
occasional spectacular event.7 I think they’re headed in 
that direction. You have to remember that it was exactly 
when ISIS was defeated that the United States withdrew 
from the JCPOA. Which was, from an Iraqi perspective, 
exactly the wrong moment. 
WHITESIDE: Is it your understanding that the most 
important factor influencing a future rise of ISIS is the US 
decision to opt out of the nuclear agreement with Iran, and 
the subsequent tensions between the two countries that 
would give room for the group to regain strength?
AL-ISTRABADI: Iraq had finally regained—at a horrible 
cost, particularly for the locals, for Mosul, for Tikrit—Iraqi 
territory, and believed it was the time to think about 
reconstruction. What we needed was a ratcheting down of 
the tensions between the United States and Iran, so that 
the stakes wouldn’t be so high for Iran to give the Iraqi po-
litical class, inferior as it is, the opportunity to think about 
what a post-ISIS Iraq should look like. By the way, this is 
one of my critiques of Brett McGurk [former US Special 
Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat 
ISIS from 2015–2018], who, in my opinion, spent zero 
time thinking about what a post-ISIS Iraq would look like. 
Although he’s not military, but as much of a civilian as I 
am, he was focused like a laser beam on liberating the next 
square meter of Iraqi territory, which isn’t his business. I 
mean that in the literal sense: that is a military function. 
He ignored what should have been his work as a diplomat. 
The military was going to coordinate how we were going 
to get Iraqi territory liberated. McGurk’s function was to 
figure out how to help create a stable polity that wouldn’t 
descend again into the same nonsense that led to the rise of 
ISIS in the first place. In my judgement, he spent zero time 
thinking about that. His whole plan was that we’d liberate 
Iraq from ISIS and Haider al-Abadi would run for prime 
minister again and, because he would be seen as the lib-
erator of Iraq, he’d be reelected. But it didn’t work that way 
because, whatever the facts are, the media narrative was 
that Hadi al-Amiri [the leader of Iraq’s Iranian-influenced 
Popular Mobilization Forces] was the great liberator of 
Iraq, not al-Abadi. 
RICE: When I was talking to one of McGurk’s advisors in 
2017, I said we still have a chance to avoid turning over all 
the successes we have made in the counter-Islamic State 
campaign to the Iranians if we recognize that, with every 
airstrike that the US-led coalition brings to bear on ISIS, 
the Iranian-backed PMF militias are seizing the ground 
without competition. The answer was simply, “Sorry, but 
that’s the strategy.” The Inherent Resolve campaign to 
liberate Mosul and defeat ISIS had to be completed within 
a two-year US election cycle. 
AL-ISTRABADI: I think my article in 2009 actually said 
this same thing.8 Unfortunately, the United States is never 
more than two years away from an election, and that’s 
been its policy in Iraq since 2003: we have to get this done 
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because we have a congressional off-year election; we have 
to get this done because we’ve got the president’s reelec-
tion; we’ve got to get that done because we’ve got another 
damned—pardon me—congressional election, etc. 
RICE: It’s interesting that you bring this up, because the 
various US and coalition leaders that I met with would 
have the same discussions on the lack of strategy—even 
beyond the immediate military objective—for a bridging 
objective to avoid disenfranchising the Sunni population. 
Because that is clearly what we are now seeing. The reason a 
lot of these tribes in Ninewa wanted to mobilize is because 
they are deathly afraid of the Iranian-backed militias. 
AL-ISTRABADI: Well, they have good reason to be. 
RICE: But then, there are also some very non-altruistic mo-
tives. Specifically, there were social-class elites who wanted 
access to political power and economic opportunities. 
They also wanted to manage the revenge against former 
ISIS members. On the one hand, these leaders wanted 
to eliminate or exile former ISIS members. On the other 
hand, some leaders wanted to pardon them. In the vacuum 
of ISIS’s defeat, these elites were going to come in and 
do certain things such as change the balance of political, 
social, and economic power in local areas. To follow up on 
the point you brought up about corruption, the United 
States conditioned the Iraqis to favor corruption over 
good governance. I can’t even tell you how many of my 
partners just wanted income streams and contracts. And 
that’s the primary reason why they wanted the Americans 
to stay in Iraq.
AL-ISTRABADI: Look back at the CPA [Coalition Provi-
sional Authority], and how many tons of hundred-dollar 
bills came up missing? And you want to talk about condi-
tioning? I will say they were modeling corrupt behaviors. 
How many no-bid contracts were led by the CPA? How 
many friends of [then-Vice President] Dick Cheney got 
contracts? This is a point that I have talked about in my 
academic life: imperial powers govern in the peripheries 
very differently from how they govern in their main cities. 
Thus, the United States modeled corrupt practices for 
the Iraqis. Not to say that our political class needed much 
tutoring in that but, nonetheless, it didn’t help. 
Also with regard to good governance, what price did [Iraqi 
Prime Minister] Nouri al-Maliki pay for targeting the 
sitting vice president of Iraq [Tariq al-Hashimi] on ter-
rorism charges? I don’t know whether al-Hashimi did the 
things he was accused of, and I have absolutely no brief to 
defend him, but the convictions were based on confessions 
and one of his guards died during the investigation. The 
Obama Administration’s response, thanks to Brett Mc-
Gurk, was that this was a domestic Iraqi issue so there was 
no price for Maliki to pay for engaging in these practices. 
He also didn’t pay a price for sending troops loyal to him 
directly into Fallujah and Ramadi in 2013 to break up 
what were largely peaceable demonstrations, which were 
having absolutely no impact in Baghdad anyway. He did 
it to show that he was tough. In 2012, there was a con-
stitutional process in parliament to withdraw confidence 
in Maliki, which had never happened before in Iraq’s 
history. We’re on our fourth or fifth incarnation of the 
Republican Era, and no government has ever fallen to such 
a vote in parliament. We were on the verge of that. What a 
precedent for constitutional governance that would have 
been! But as the leader of the opposition said, “I can resist 
American pressure and I can resist Iranian pressure, but I 
can’t resist American and Iranian pressure.” So, although a 
vote of no confidence was his idea, he was the first person 
to withdraw his bloc’s votes, and then the whole effort 
collapsed. That became, in my opinion, the proximate 
cause for the rise of ISIS two years later. The lesson that 
Maliki learned was that he could get away with anything. 
US policy has consistently been, “Who are we for?” rather 
US policy has consistently been, “Who 
are we for?” rather than “What are we 
for?” And so US policy will continue to 
fail in Iraq.
Vice president of Iraq Tariq al-Hashimi
A lot of these tribes in Ninewa wanted to 
mobilize because they are deathly afraid 
of the Iranian-backed militias.
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than “What are we for?” And so US policy will continue to 
fail in Iraq. 
WHITESIDE: Can the legal and political integration of the 
PMF into the Iraqi government be undone in any way? 
AL-ISTRABADI: Practically speaking, it’s very difficult, be-
cause they weren’t truly integrated [into national security 
forces]. They were formally integrated and they’re on a 
government paycheck, but they were integrated whole, as 
discrete units with their own command structure. And, to 
my knowledge, they report directly, officially, to the prime 
minister rather than through the legal chain of [military] 
command. That’s actually one of the flaws of the Iraqi 
constitution. It says that the prime minister is the com-
mander in chief, but it doesn’t say what that means. The 
South African constitution says the same thing, and runs 
on for five pages about what it means for the president 
to be the commander in chief. But with that line in Iraq’s 
constitution being as vague as it is, prime ministers can 
do whatever the hell they want to and technically they’re 
complying with the constitution. It’s a huge flaw. There’s 
a legal chain of command in the enabling statutes but, of 
course, a constitutional provision trumps the statutes. 
WHITESIDE: Are there alternative ways for the United 
States to support a counter-ISIS campaign that would be 
less intrusive and accommodate Iraqi desires for much less 
overt American influence, now that ISIS is not an imme-
diate serious political threat? Is there room for such a shift, 
especially from a combating terrorism perspective? Or are 
you more worried that this will go to extremes? 
AL-ISTRABADI: If you remember the famous Atlantic 
interview of Obama and some of his officials by Jeff Gold-
berg, even the Obama administration’s thinking about 
Syria at the time was: do nothing or [repeat the Vietnam 
experience]; do nothing or [repeat the Iraq invasion and 
occupation of 2003–11].9 Vladimir Putin has proven 
fairly well that you can intervene militarily in a limited 
way and achieve your strategic objective without putting 
150,000 troops on the ground. I’m not condoning the 
manner in which the Russian air force conducts its opera-
tions, indifferent as it is to civilian casualties and unafraid 
to do anything at all. I understand that no American 
commander would tolerate that kind of approach to war, 
and I support that.
There was clearly some spectrum of intermediate ap-
proaches the United States could have implemented 
between zero and another Iraq and Syria. Now saying that, 
that has to be true of Iraq’s approach as well. Continued 
security cooperation between Iraq and the United States, 
including continued training and intelligence sharing, 
is in the interest of both Iraq and the United States, and 
I gather that the Iraqi government has recently resumed 
[limited] counter-ISIS operations with the United States, 
since the assassination of Qassem Soleimani.10 One of 
the mistakes that occurred in 2011 was the withdrawal of 
intelligence cooperation. I am told that it crashed virtually 
to zero when the United States decided to completely 
withdraw military forces in 2009. 
RICE: I suspect that is true, but I believe we maintained 
advisors with the Counter-Terrorism Service from 2011 to 
2014, when the United States returned in support of Iraq’s 
central government to defeat ISIS. 
AL-ISTRABADI: In any case, the intelligence exchange 
was inadequate. McGurk says—and I have no reason to 
think it’s not true—that in the three or four days before 
Mosul fell, he actually warned Maliki that ISIS was getting 
ready to surge back into Iraq and that Maliki dismissed the 
notion. Obviously, there was a loss of trust between Maliki 
and Americans like McGurk on the ground. McGurk has 
also said that even [Kurdish President Masoud] Barzani 
was getting hints in Erbil of what was coming. Maybe none 
of that is true, but that’s what he testified to. 
WHITESIDE: I don’t think much of that is true, from 
what I’ve seen in my research of the Islamic State’s military 
campaign in Iraq before 2014. The ISIS campaign in Iraq 
was substantial, if not operating at a very high level, as early 
as 2012 if not before. The attack data show that Mosul was 
under severe stress in 2012 averaging 10 attacks a day. We 
were missing that. You’re correct to say that the United 
States either didn’t synthesize that information correctly or 
didn’t pass it on to trusted partners. I think the Iraqis also 
knew, but the reporting chain up to Maliki was damaged 
because of political issues [mainly because Maliki made 
political appointments of generals in the security forces 
who were loyal to him but not necessarily the best choice 
for the job]. 
RICE: My research focuses on external patrons and local 
clients. Iraq’s constitution seems to be a great example of 
how external patrons can influence the way a government 
is formed while a country is being occupied. Who was the 
prime driver in the writing of the constitution: Americans, 
external patrons, the British, or the UN? Also, what were 
the frictions that influenced the process? 
AL-ISTRABADI: I wrote about this in my 2009 article [“A 
Constitution Without Constitutionalism: Reflections on 
26 CTX   Vol. 10, No. 2
Iraq’s Failed Constitutional Process” (see note 8)]. The 
Americans didn’t really care what Iraq’s constitution said. 
They needed a constitution [pounding hand on table]! 
Because we’re gonna have elections here [loud pounding]! 
And someone needed to be able to say, “Look at the 
progress we’re having in Iraq.” Sheikh Humam Hamoudi 
was the chairman of the drafting committee. The TAL 
[Transitional Administrative Law] also provided for two 
possible delay mechanisms in the drafting of a permanent 
constitution: one would extend the drafting time by six 
months without triggering new elections, and the other 
would mandate elections in the face of an impasse or the 
failure of the constitutional referendum. In that case, the 
one-year drafting deadline would be renewed. 
The TAL, the interim constitution, took longer to draft than 
the permanent constitution of Iraq. As I remember, we took 
about four months to draft the TAL. Work on the perma-
nent constitution took less than five weeks. A consequence 
of that speed is that there is not even a provision for the 
resignation of a prime minister in the constitution, an event 
that occurred on the twenty-ninth of November 2019.11 
Sheikh Hamoudi asked for a 30-day extension under the 
six-month provision of the TAL, but before anyone in the 
Iraqi political class responded to him, Zalmay Khalilzad, 
the US ambassador to Iraq, said, “The Iraqis don’t need any 
more time. There will be no extension.” So our timetable 
was an American timetable. 
Now, you wanted to ask about the content of the constitu-
tion. The Americans didn’t care what was in it, as long 
as they could say, in the 2006 US off-year elections, that 
it was done. So we fought tooth and nail in the TAL to 
keep religious scholars off the constitutional court, and we 
succeeded. It was Ambassador Khalilzad who conceded to 
it in the final document. There were no Sunni interlocutors 
in the drafting process to speak of. They were locked out. 
The Kurds didn’t care because they knew that under the 
idiotic federalism provision, they could basically annul 
any law they didn’t like, with very limited exceptions such 
as foreign policy and national defense. So they didn’t care 
what was in the final document, and they weren’t going to 
infuriate the Shi’a religious party over this. So there was 
nobody to say, Wait a minute, damn it, you’re dismantling 
the civil state of Iraq! Khalilzad wrote an op-ed that 
justified this provision, saying that if Islam is going to be 
a source of law, then of course you have to have religious 
scholars on the court. Well, Islam has been the source of 
law of every Arab country since the end of the Ottoman 
Empire, but it doesn’t mean we have to have religious 
scholars on our courts! I’m sorry I’m getting angry about 
this—it’s the ignorance and the arrogance of the officials 
that we have to deal with. I dealt with Khalilzad before I 
went to New York, and then again briefly while we were 
both in New York before I left. The arrogance  
was incredible. 
And if you look at the Iraqi constitution, it is a description 
of the fears of each community, mostly the Kurds and 
the Shi’a. There is nothing in the constitution that unites 
the Iraqis as such. The concepts of nationality, of nation-
hood, of belonging, do not exist in it. And the Americans 
didn’t care; they needed the constitution on a timetable. 
In the meantime, I have the Marajiyah ratcheting up its 
demands to increase the Islamization of the constitution 
and of the state. Now it has backpedaled on this because 
the constitution has been a spectacular failure. So now I 
have the Marajiyah in Najaf, Ayatollah al-Sistani’s office, 
calling for a civil state. Well, where the hell were you fifteen 
years ago? And what, by the way, does a civil state mean 
to the Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani? Does it mean the same 
thing that it meant to me? I have my doubts. Or is it just a 
slogan, because that’s where the Iraqi youth in the street are 
headed? They want a civil state. Nowhere in the constitu-
tion does it mention al-muwatin, which may be translated 
as “citizen.” A sectarian division of spoils does not appear 
anywhere the constitution, but it is promoted indirectly by 
inclusion of the aza al-Husayn—Husayni practices [Shi’a 
mourning rituals for Husayn, the slain grandson of the 
Prophet, killed at the Battle of Karbala in 680 CE]. I don’t 
know how you translate it—the rituals that are associated 
with self-harm [tatbir, or self-flagellation, is a customary 
act during Ashura celebrations]. That’s in the Iraqi consti-
tution, for God’s sake! 
Zalmay Khalilzad
If you look at the Iraqi constitution,  
it is a description of the fears of  
each community.
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So, the Iraqi constitution is far from attempting to form a 
more perfect union. It codifies the disunion of Iraq. And 
that was the work of the Iraqis. If you want me to say the 
Iranians did this, they didn’t! 
RICE: I’m interested in external patrons and local clients, as 
we just discussed. I think it’s obvious that the lack of a civil 
state decreased the certainty on the Iraqi street, decreased 
the certainty of day-to-day life because people didn’t feel as 
if they were citizens. There was a disunion. 
AL-ISTRABADI: It’s not that the rank and file didn’t feel 
like citizens. It was the political elite who had returned 
from exile. There’s a huge distinction between those two 
groups. The constitution was written, from a Shi’a religious 
perspective, as a hedge against what was, specifically in 
the view of the supreme council, a Sunni return to power. 
Now, by the way, I reject the notion that the Sunnis were 
running Iraq under Saddam Hussain. Saddam Hussain 
ran Iraq! He happened to be from Tikrit, the Sunni part 
of Iraq. The Sunni people weren’t running a goddamned 
thing in Iraq but that was the narrative, and Sunni equals 
Ba’athist. So the constitution was a hedge against a 
Ba’athist return to power. 
INTERVIEW TEAM: Thank you for helping us understand 
the complexities of the Iraqi-US strategic relationship and 
our rivalry with Iran in Iraq, and the evolution of current 
Iraqi politics. We appreciate your time, Mr. Ambassador.
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AS I WRITE THIS, IN THE SPRING OF 2020, I 
am living through the third month of California’s state-
wide shelter-in-place order to control the spread of the 
novel coronavirus. My neighbor remains convinced that 
measures to control the coronavirus pandemic are part of 
a political plot by persons nefarious and unidentified. The 
online film Plandemic continues to spread like, well, a vi-
rus, despite widespread debunking of its incendiary claims 
and the responsible efforts of both YouTube and Facebook 
to take it down. The hashtag #virustruth continues to spin 
the conspiratorial theory that the pandemic is part of a 
plot by elites with unspecified motives to initiate a third 
world war. To borrow a phrase from Stevie Wonder, it’s 
starting to feel like Truth’s in need of love today.
Case in point: I recently received an email from a military 
officer and former student from Africa. I had written him 
earlier in the month, asking how he and his family were 
faring with the COVID-19 pandemic, and how the virus 
was affecting his country. When he replied, he assured 
me that both he and his family were well and doing all 
they could to remain so, including wearing masks, using 
sanitizers, and washing their hands often. However, his 
country, he said, was not coping as well; the virus was just 
beginning to strike hard and the number of deaths was 
rising. He offered two specific reasons why this was so: 
his country possesses a weak, under-equipped healthcare 
system, and the population does not believe in the serious-
ness of the threat. The former reason did not surprise me; 
after all, his country is among the poorest in the world. 
However, the latter reason, a distrusting population, 
struck me as one more indicator of a growing assault on 
Truth—and by extension, Trust—around the world. 
In response to my student’s email, I found myself thinking 
about two writers: the philosophers Harry Frankfurt and 
Sissela Bok. Although they’re starkly different from each 
other in most respects, they share a common view of the 
importance of Truth.
Frankfurt first published his small book On Truth in 
2006, as a sequel to his 2005 national bestselling essay, On 
Bullshit. In On Truth, he offers a quick summary of the 
earlier piece, including a working definition of “bullshit” 
as the tool of choice for individuals “who are attempting by 
what they say to manipulate the opinions and the attitudes 
of those to whom they speak.”1 Such manipulators, he sug-
gests, focus solely on “whether what they say is effective in 
accomplishing this manipulation. Correspondingly, they 
are more or less indifferent to whether what they say is true 
or whether it is false.”2 I have no idea whether Frankfurt 
foresaw our current post-truth, alternative facts, fake 
news world of conspiracy theories and deliberate misin-
formation and disinformation, or whether he was simply 
reacting to current trends as he saw them. In either case, 
he obviously recognized the “extraordinary prevalence and 
persistence”3 of such manipulative efforts in American 
culture at the time, and he offered the strong opinion that 
“bullshitting constitutes a more insidious threat than lying 
does to the conduct of civilized life.”4 
Shortly after On Bullshit was published, however, Frank-
furt realized he had committed a serious philosophical 
omission: he had taken for granted that his readers would 
automatically agree on “exactly why truth actually is so im-
portant to us, or why we should especially care about it.”5 
He subsequently wrote On Truth to advocate that “truth 
often possesses very considerable practical utility.”6 He 
further suggested that any society that hopes to continue 
to exist must have “a robust appreciation of the endlessly 
protean utility of truth.”7 To drive the point home, he asks,
After all, how could a society that cared too little 
for truth make sufficiently well-informed judgments 
and decisions concerning the most suitable disposi-
tion of its public business? How could it possibly 
flourish, or even survive, without knowing enough 
about relevant facts to pursue its ambitions success-
fully and to cope prudently and effectively with its 
problems?8 
“Truth often possesses very 
considerable practical utility.”
Frankfurt published On Bullshit in 2005 and its sequel On Truth in 2006. 
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By comparison, Sissela Bok first published her expansive 
study, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life, 
in 1978, revised it in 1989, and then revised it again in 
1999, following the scandal involving US President Bill 
Clinton and a young White House intern named Monica 
Lewinsky. In Lying, Bok undertakes a moral examination 
of the pernicious and manipulative nature of lying. She 
considers a spectrum of circumstance, from personal crises 
to deceiving the public for its own good, under which lying 
may occur. In doing so, she carefully defines a lie as a state-
ment known to the liar to be false and intended to deceive 
and manipulate the perceptions of the one being lied to.9  
She then identifies at least two fundamentally unethical 
and potentially dangerous aspects of lying and, by implica-
tion, highlights the moral importance of telling the truth. 
First, she argues, lies are corrosive to the social fabric. In 
that regard, she agrees with Frankfurt that “some level of 
truthfulness has always been seen as essential to human 
society, no matter how deficient the observance of other 
moral principles.”1⁰ To support this assertion, she alludes 
to the eighteenth-century literary figure, Samuel Johnson, 
and his observation that “even the devils themselves . . . 
do not lie to one another, since the society of Hell could 
not subsist without truth any more than others.”11 The 
bottom line, Bok suggests, is that any society, even in Hell, 
will collapse when truth becomes indistinguishable from 
fiction.
As with Frankfurt, I have no knowledge of whether 
Bok consciously anticipated a world in which the “2020 
Edelman Trust Barometer” would report that in a majority 
of the countries surveyed, “less than half of the mass popu-
lation trust their institutions to do what is right,”12 or a 
time in which the 2019 Pew Research Center Report Trust 
and Distrust in America would assert that “Americans 
admit they at times have trouble distinguishing the truth 
from falsehood from certain sources.”13 It’s worth noting 
that both of those reports were prepared before the pan-
demic. But I do know that Bok understood the unethical 
and corrosive costs of using lies to manipulate the percep-
tions of others, whether members of society as a whole or 
specific individuals. 
For Bok, any deception resulting from the manipulation 
of another is essentially a coercive act because “when it 
succeeds, it can give power to the deceiver—power that 
all who suffer the consequences of lies would not wish to 
abdicate.”14  Simply put, she claims that the liar invokes a 
power over the receiver of the lie that alters the latter’s per-
ception of what is, or was, or will be, and that this power 
is one the victim of the lie would likely never knowingly 
grant. And that power, she insists, is essentially the same 
as any other means of coercion, in that the intent of the lie 
is to influence another to act in ways he or she would not 
otherwise choose and that are likely not in the victim’s  
best interests.
It’s that same power, Bok contends, that constitutes the 
second unethical aspect of lies based on deception and ma-
nipulation. At the purely personal level, a lie can dramati-
cally impact the one lied to, “since we, when lied to, have 
no way to judge which lies are the trivial ones, and since we 
have no confidence that liars will restrict themselves to just 
such trivial lies, the perspective of the deceived leads us to 
be wary of all deception.”15 In other words, she cautions, 
once bitten, forever shy.
Lying by Sissela Bok
For Bok, any deception resulting from 
the manipulation of another is essentially 
a coercive act.
US President Bill Clinton and Monica Lewinsky 
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As a second case in point, consider another former student 
of mine—let’s call him Felix—who unexpectedly stopped 
by my campus office one summer day after graduating 
the quarter before. I was surprised to see him, but also 
delighted. He had been a joy to have in my ethics class: 
intelligent, funny, and always willing to participate. He 
knocked on my office door, asked if he could come in, and, 
when I said yes, entered and closed the door behind him. 
He sat in a chair by my desk, asked if I had a moment to 
talk, and, when I again said yes, immediately began to tell 
the story of how he had a met a local woman during his 
studies at my school. The two of them, he said, had fallen 
deeply in love. At the time, he was a newly pinned captain 
in an elite government security unit; she was a rising 
executive in a start-up tech company. After almost a year 
of dating, he was planning to ask her to marry him, but 
he felt he owed it to her to be fully truthful and explain 
in more specific detail what his job entailed. Up until that 
time, he had been deliberately vague. So he shared with her 
the fact that his position occasionally required him to go 
undercover and assume another identity. In that assumed 
role, he then would manipulate and deceive other indi-
viduals to act in ways that were not always in their own 
best interests, although those actions may have been in the 
best interest of either law enforcement or the government. 
While undercover, he explained, he might not be able to 
contact her and, what is more, he often wouldn’t even be 
able to tell her when he would come home. He hoped she’d 
understand, see his work as patriotic, brave, and heroic, 
and trust in the strength of the love he had shown for her 
over the past year. 
Unfortunately, she didn’t see it that way. Instead of ac-
cepting his plea for trust, she reacted with shock and fear. 
If his job and training required him to lie and manipulate 
others, she asked, how could she trust that he wouldn't ever 
manipulate her? She’d been lied to by lovers before and 
she didn’t want to go through that again. How could she 
know he wasn’t lying and deceiving her right then? How 
could she trust his words? Felix assured her he was telling 
the truth and that his love for her was sincere, but she 
couldn’t cross that bridge. A few days later, she broke off 
their relationship and Felix was devastated. He was being 
truthful and hoped that she would believe him, while she 
was trying to protect herself and avoid once again being 
manipulated and deceived by someone who claimed to love 
her. In the end, she couldn’t escape her distrust.
At the end of his story, Felix looked at me and asked what I 
thought he could do to change the woman’s mind. I knew 
that the answer was “not much.” I offered some consoling 
support, and suggested that in time he might find someone 
equally enchanting and deserving of his excellent char-
acter. I knew, however, that for some situations there are 
no easy answers, and that Sissela Bok was right. Lies aren’t 
only corrosive to society; they eat at the hearts of the ones 
lied to.
In fairness to Bok, though, I must add that she is not an 
absolutist; she concedes that not all lies are evil and that 
truth, obviously, is not always without cruelty. She does 
not insist that the truth be told and damn the conse-
quences. In fact, with reference to “white” lies, she  
declares that
to say that white lies should be kept at a minimum 
is not to endorse the telling of truths to all comers. 
Silence and discretion, respect for the privacy and 
for the feelings of others must naturally govern 
what is spoken. The gossip one conveys and the 
malicious reports one spreads may be true without 
therefore being excusable. And the truth told in 
such a way as to wound may be unforgivably cruel, 
as when a physician answers a young man asking if 
he has cancer with a curt Yes as he leaves the room. 
He may not have lied, but he has failed in every 
professional duty of respect and concern for his 
patient.16 
I agree with Bok. Not only can telling the truth in some 
situations be cruel, but I believe it can also carry high risk, 
particularly if the situation in question involves speaking 
truth to power. Neither Frankfurt or Bok addresses that 
dilemma, but I believe it merits its moment, if for no other 
reason than, as Steven Leonard writes,
in an environment where the people in positions of 
authority are willing and able to listen, the truth 
is a powerful change agent. In an environment 
where the people in positions of authority aren’t as 
willing to listen—or have no interest whatsoever 
in listening—the truth is an unwelcome intrusion 
and the consequences that come with speaking it 
can be brutal.17 
That brutality can become abundantly clear within any 
organizational hierarchy. As the former management 
editor of the Financial Times, Gill Corkindale, affirms, 
“Bosses have many means to intimidate — by position, 
power, personality or even wealth and a sense of entitle-
ment. And even if they do not openly intimidate, most 
executives expect and assume that employees will not 
question them and company policy, or, if they do, that they 
will go quietly.”18 Those employees or subordinates who 
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feel “impelled to speak up or ‘go public,’” she assures,  
“can be condemned for not being team-players or branded 
as troublemakers.”19 
Consider the case of a young, newly minted military 
officer, Jaime, who was selected to a special operations 
force and deployed to a platoon overseas. The platoon, 
based at an ally’s airfield, was under the command of a 
recognized hero within the force, a leader renowned for his 
bravery, patriotism, and integrity. Soon after Jaime arrived, 
however, he discovered that not everything in the platoon 
was on point. The once-heroic commander had developed 
an alcohol abuse problem and let his command of the 
platoon slip. Several members of the platoon, following the 
commander’s lead, were slacking in their duties and openly 
drinking during the workday. When Jaime learned that 
two members of the platoon had discharged their weapons 
at road signs in the local countryside, he became concerned 
enough to share his unease over the platoon’s morale with 
the senior enlisted officer, who listened and then advised 
Jaime to drop it. The commander, the chief told him, was 
aware of the behavior occurring within the platoon and 
didn’t see it as a loss of discipline. Nor, the chief added, 
did the platoon’s members, who understood all that the 
commander had gone through in his heroic career, perceive 
the commander’s behavior as a lack of leadership. And 
lastly, the chief assured him that the commander never ap-
preciated receiving either advice or criticism from a junior 
officer as inexperienced as Jaime. 
Whenever I reached this point in the story while teaching 
this case study to my ethics classes, I’d ask two questions: 
Does Jaime have a problem, and, if so, what should he do? 
Inevitably, there was no consensus among my students. 
Most answers regarding whether Jaime had a problem 
hinged on the degree to which he did, or did not, see his 
personal and professional principles aligned with the 
behavior of the platoon. If his principles aligned, then not 
a problem. If his principles did not align, but he valued his 
career in the force more than asserting what he believed to 
be right, then still not a problem, and Jaime could simply 
fall in line for the duration of the deployment. If, however, 
his principles did not align and he valued them more than 
he valued his career, then he had a big problem. As to what 
Jaime should do in the last instance, the answers I heard 
from my students were always varied and complex. 
According to Corkindale, the political economist Albert 
O. Hirschman identified the three most principled choices 
facing a civilian in Jaime’s position as “exit, voice, and 
loyalty.”20 That person, Corkindale explains, can choose to 
1. exit the situation via a formal principled letter of 
resignation;
2. voice one’s concerns by speaking truth to power and 
accept the consequences; or
3. remain and serve as a loyal team member.21 
Unfortunately for Jaime, the matter of loyalty is not 
limited to the third choice alone, and for most people pur-
suing careers in homeland security and national defense, 
there are aspects of loyalty inherent in all three choices. 
In choice 1, Jaime’s paths to formally exiting his current 
assignment are complex and would force him to choose 
between loyalty to himself and his principles, loyalty to the 
members of his platoon, and loyalty to the larger force he 
serves. All such paths would likely require an explanation 
to higher-ups of his request for reassignment, and Jaime 
would have to confront the intersection of what the ethi-
cist Rushworth Kidder calls the “truth vs. loyalty” ethical 
dilemma.22 Rather than remaining silent and loyal to the 
platoon, he could tell the truth about why he wanted to 
leave or he could lie, fabricate an excuse, and maintain 
his loyalty to the platoon while protecting his career. In 
choice 2, he could express his concerns directly to the 
commander, but if the commander’s response went as the 
NCO predicted, it’s quite likely the issue of loyalty would 
be raised and Jaime would have to declare his position 
going forward within the platoon one way or the other. 
Finally, in choice 3, Jaime could possibly feign loyalty 
to the platoon and remain in his position, but he would 
do so at the expense of loyalty to his own principles and 
ethics. Whatever Jaime’s choice, he would—as the French 
philosopher, Michel Foucault, cautioned—confront the 
inherent risks in speaking truth to such power.23  
Where does that leave us? To begin with, we have both 
Frankfurt and Bok telling us that lying is harmful to the 
moral fabric of society, that it fosters distrust and erodes 
the ability of a society to function. Add to their dark 
portent Frankfurt’s warning about the pernicious danger 
of bullshit as a similar threat to society, and Bok’s observa-
tion that lying is both insidious and unethical because 
the liar assumes a power over the one being lied to that 
the latter is both unaware of and likely would never have 
Employees or subordinates who feel 
“impelled to speak up or ‘go public’ 
can be condemned for not being 
team-players.”
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willingly granted. By lying, the liar exercises the power to 
manipulate the victim of the lie as coercively as if he or she 
had used more overt efforts of control. And thus, we are 
left with the conclusion by both Frankfurt and Bok that 
truth is foundational to society and the individual. 
For what it’s worth, I agree with them. Yet, I also recognize 
that speaking truth under every circumstance, regardless 
of consequence, can, as Bok noted, simply be cruel. And 
when organizational dynamics come into play, speaking 
truth can also be potentially risky for the speaker, espe-
cially at the point where truth, trust, and loyalty intersect. 
However, speaking truth to power has always carried a 
threat to one’s reputation and career, and, sadly, I doubt 
that threat will ever disappear. Yet, in times like these, 
when truth and falsehood for many are becoming indis-
tinguishable, when society is awash in disinformation and 
misinformation, and trust appears to be on the wane, I still 
believe in advocating for truth whenever possible, and I 
still hold speaking it as my first default.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR  
 
George Lober is a poet and ethicist. 
Copyright 2020, George Lober. The US federal govern-
ment is granted for itself and others acting on its behalf in 
perpetuity a paid-up, nonexclusive, irrevocable worldwide 
license in this work to reproduce, prepare derivative works, 
distribute copies to the public, and perform publicly 
and display publicly, by or on behalf of the US federal 
government. All other rights are reserved by the copyright 
owner(s). Foreign copyrights may apply.
NOTES
1. Harry G. Frankfurt, On Truth (New York: Knopf Doubleday 
Publishing Group, 2006), loc. 4, Kindle.
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., loc. 5.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., loc. 15.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., loc. 16.
9. Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life (New 
York: Vintage Books, 2011) loc. 612 and 632, Kindle.
10. Ibid., loc. 708.
11. Ibid., loc. 709. 
12. “2020 Edelman Trust Barometer,” Edelman, 19 January 2020: 
https://www.edelman.com/trustbarometer
13. Lee Rainie, Scott Keeter, and Andrew Perrin, Trust and Distrust 




14. Bok, Lying, loc. 763.
15. Ibid., loc. 749.
16. Ibid., loc. 1563.
17. Steven Matthew Leonard, “Hitting the Wall: When Speaking 
Truth to Power Gets You Nowhere,” ClearanceJobs, 18 De-
cember 2018: https://news.clearancejobs.com/2018/12/18/hit-
ting-the-wall-when-speaking-truth-to-power-gets-you-nowhere/
18. Gill Corkindale, “The Price of (Not) Speaking Truth to Power,” 





22. Rushworth Kidder, How Good People Make Tough Choices (New 
York: HarperCollins, 2009) 6, Kindle. 
23. Michel Foucault, “The Meaning and Evolution of the Word 
‘Parrhesia:’ Discourse and Truth, Problematization of Parrhesia,” 
Foucault, last modified 24 October 1983: https://foucault.info/
parrhesia/foucault.DT1.wordParrhesia.en/ 
I still believe in advocating for truth 
whenever possible, and I still hold 
speaking it as my first default.
34 CTX   Vol. 10, No. 2
MOST CURRENT CYBER WARGAMES ARE DEVELOPED TO  
help businesses think through cyber crisis and incident response scenarios. By 
delving into actions and reactions, these commercial games reveal their roots in 
traditional military wargames; however, the scenarios they address apply only 
to the organizations for which they are built, and thus do not have extensive 
training and education applications outside such organizations. For this reason, 
a team at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, developed 
CyberWar: 2025, an interactive educational wargame that is designed to teach 
cyberspace operations and can be used on a large scale within government and 
military organizations.1 This article describes the design process of CyberWar: 
2025, focusing in particular on how the game developers incorporated specific 
cyber concepts and how the game is intended to be used pedagogically. 
CyberWar: 2025: Design, Development, and Mechanics
CyberWar: 2025 is a turn-based multiplayer cyber wargame that focuses on the 
three core cyber-effect categories of defensive cyberspace operations (DCO), 
offensive cyberspace operations (OCO), and computer network exploitation 
(CNE).2 Using these core categories, players explore the cyber domain, develop 
and execute a cyber strategy, and react to incoming actions from adversaries 
within a simulated cyberspace environment. The codebase of CyberWar: 2025 
is written entirely in JavaScript, HTML, CSS, and other open-source libraries to 
create a sound and interactive game environment suitable for all types of players. 
The premise of CyberWar: 2025 was to create a collaborative training environ-
ment in which leaders, policymakers, and non-technical personnel partner with 
those who have experience in cyberspace operations, cybersecurity, or a similar 
technical field. As a tool to teach cybersecurity, CyberWar: 2025 is most effec-
tive when used in conjunction with a training course. It simulates a realistic 
cyberspace operational environment and models the effects of current real-world 
cyber activities in a non-technical and straightforward manner.3
CyberWar: 2025 began as physical gameboards cut from acrylic; after nine 
months of development, it had evolved into a releasable software project that 
is cross-platform and lightweight, and requires minimal resources to set up 
and run (see figure 1). CyberWar: 2025’s transformation into a software-based 
game drastically improved its efficiency and accuracy when compared to the 
The Game Floor
Cyberspace Operations 
Training Using  
CyberWar: 2025
By MSG David Tyler Long,  
US Naval Postgraduate School
The complexity of 
CyberWar: 2025 lies within 
the core game mechanics 
and the dynamic 
challenges that each 
player faces from one 
round to the next.
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complicated setup of the tabletop version, which required 
several people to run a single game of 15 rounds within 
a two-hour window. Hundreds of game modifications 
and countless hours of code-writing and playtesting were 
required to produce the final version of CyberWar: 2025. 
CyberWar: 2025 is an abstract two-dimensional repre-
sentation of a single cyber network that is divided into six 
separate sub-domains. At the start of a game, each player 
controls one of the sub-domains (see figure 2). As the game 
progresses, players seek to expand into other sub-domains 
and take control of as much of the board as they can. 
Think of each sub-domain as a network infrastructure that 
emanates from the player’s base and builds inward to the 
center of the board. This network infrastructure consists of 
smaller network points (called Server Nodes in the game) 
that players have to control in order to gain additional 
resources known as Action Points. These Action Points 
can be used by players to conduct cyber-effect research, 
attack adversaries, and better posture themselves against 
enemy actions. The overall objective of CyberWar: 2025 
is to dominate the cyber network, either by controlling all 
available Server Nodes or by denying other players access 
to these Nodes and thus forcing them off the board and 
out of the game. Throughout the game session, players have 
to plan and enact their cyber strategy using the nine cyber-
effect attributes available to them, which will be discussed 
later in this article. Players also have to manage their 
resources, maintain their cyber network, and defend their 
base from encroaching adversarial players. The complexity 
of CyberWar: 2025 lies within the core game mechanics 
and the dynamic challenges that each player faces from 
one round to the next.
Server Nodes (depicted as small hexagons on the game-
board; see figure 2) are the only attack/defend structures 
for all actions within the game. From these Server Nodes, 
players can launch offensive cyberattacks with OCO and 
CNE effects or defend against incoming attacks with DCO 
effects; however, the success rate of these effects requires 
a sound strategy and a bit of luck. When players secure 
their Server Nodes, they are essentially building up their 
defenses against other players, while at the same time im-
proving their odds of success in attacking their adversaries.
A fundamental CyberWar: 2025 mechanism is that of 
agnostic cyber domain roles. Instead of assigning the 
players roles that reflect current cyber-threat problem 
sets, such as state or non-state actors, all players are equal 
cyber actors on the gameboard.4 Players can adjust their 
role at any time during the game session to suit their cyber 
strategy. and are free to experiment with their strategy 
and adapt to the continually changing game environment. 
With each consecutive round, Server Nodes are captured, 
lost, and recaptured. Players can have a vast Server Node 
network one minute and immediately lose their access to 
other players’ domains in the next turn because one critical 
Server Node was taken by another player or removed from 
the game board entirely.
Another mechanism within CyberWar: 2025 is its 
dependence on the randomization of cyber effects, which 
is achieved through the integration of a dice roll and the 
player’s attack/defense base value, or Server Node strength. 
The dice roll yields a randomized value between 1 and 
100, simulating a 100-sided die, which is calculated in the 
software code with each action the players queue in their 
adjudication lists. Base value and the dice roll combine to 
provide the player’s attack/defend value; if it is higher than 
the opponent’s value, then the action is successful. This 
randomization also ensures that no two game sessions are 
identical, even though their outcomes may be similar. 
Figure 1. The early stages of CyberWar: 2025. From left to right: two prototype acrylic tabletop boards;  
the digital beta version in a web browser.
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To be successful in the game, players 
must invest resources in the cyber ef-
fects they need to execute their cyber 
strategy.
Finally, single-player view and “fog of war” make up the 
most pivotal aspects of the game. CyberWar: 2025 accom-
modates an observer view and six individual player views. 
While the observer view reveals the entire board, the 
single-player view is limited to the actions of that player, 
who cannot view another player’s private network without 
using exploitation effects. This mechanic reflects the real 
world in that actions in the cyber domain are not readily 
observable because cyberspace is not tactile. Also, single-
player views ensure that opposing players cannot cheat 
against one another or interfere with another’s planned 
actions. The “fog of war” effect derives directly from the 
single-player view: while players see all actions happening 
within their own domain, actions occurring outside of 
their domain are hidden. As players venture out on the 
board and expand their cyber networks by using OCO 
or CNE cyber effects, the larger operational environment 
becomes more visible to them. 
In addition to the mechanics mentioned above, CyberWar: 
2025 players also need to overcome the challenges of 
resource management and timing. To be successful in the 
game, players must invest resources in the cyber effects 
they need to execute their cyber strategy. Developing and 
launching each cyber effect has a cost, and that cost is am-
plified based on the location relationship. This cost accrues 
when launching cyber effects over domain boundaries 
between the defender’s and the attacker’s Server Nodes. 
For example, players executing an effect on Tier 4 Server 
Nodes outside of their domain add four Action Points to 
the cost of their cyber effect. The rationale behind this 
mechanic is to simulate the real-world operational costs 
required to initially gain access to a network, such as by-
passing a firewall, intrusion detection system, or network 
gateway.
Nine Cyber Effects
To form and execute a cyber strategy that can dominate 
adversaries, players must understand the relationships 
between the nine available cyber effects and how to use 
each one. The DCO category contains the Secure, Expel, 
and Analyze cyber effects. The sole purpose of Secure, 
which is readily available at the beginning of the game, 
is to build up Server Node defenses to a maximum value 
of four. Expel, which is used against adversaries who 
have exploited the defender’s Server Nodes, removes the 
adversary from those Nodes and prevents him or her from 
conducting further hostile actions within the defender’s 
network. Analyze is a modified Scan cyber effect (Scan is 
a CNE effect and will be discussed later in this section); its 
only purpose is to identify adversaries who have exploited 
Server Nodes anywhere across the defending player’s net-
work. An additional effect of Analyze is to identify all the 
Server Nodes adjacent to the player’s network for potential 
future cyber actions.
The three OCO cyber effects, Acquire, Manipulate, and 
Deny, are all overt actions. Acquire takes control of any 
Server Node, occupied or unoccupied, and is available at 
the beginning of the game. Once a player acquires a Server 
Node, the next step is to use Secure to defend it. Only 
one player can overtly control a single Server Node at a 
time. Manipulate is a modified form of Acquire, with the 
only difference being that the attacking player can spoof 
or mask herself as another player. The significant benefit 
of Manipulate is to create conflict between two or more 
rival adversaries or to hide in plain sight on an adversary’s 
network by using deception and disruption. Deny is 
the third cyber effect in the OCO category, and it is the 
“nuclear option.” When successfully launched on a Server 
Node, Deny permanently removes that Server Node from 
the playable board, effectively shrinking the operational 
network. Deny is also the only cyber effect that can be 
used to remove players from the game by allowing a player 
to block an adversary’s network access. A player who is 
deadlocked in this way cannot take any further actions 
and thus is forcibly removed from the game.
Finally, the CNE category contains the covert cyber effects 
Scan, Exploit, and Implant. The Scan effect is immediately 
available and is used to view Server Nodes adjacent to 
the player’s already acquired Nodes. The only difference 
between Scan and the DCO effect of Analyze is that Scan 
Figure 2. CyberWar: 2025, version 1.2
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can identify an exploiting adversary one Server Node at 
a time, but cannot reveal what is happening across the 
player’s entire network. Exploit is the clandestine arm 
of the OCO Acquire. Exploit has the same mechanics 
of Acquire; however, Exploit allows multiple players to 
operate on a single Server Node, whereas Acquire provides 
one-for-one control. Think of Exploit as a backdoor into a 
sub-network that other players can access and from which 
they can maneuver around the network; however, the 
Server Node itself is still controlled by just one person. 
Players who have successfully exploited a Node cannot use 
any of the DCO cyber effects to defend it because they do 
not actively control it. 
Implant is the most expensive CNE cyber effect, and it 
is the only dual-action effect. As a cyber effect modifier, 
Implant reduces the Secure strength of a Server Node to its 
minimum value, rendering that Server Node more vulner-
able to attack in that round of play and thus improving 
the odds for a successful attack. When used in conjunc-
tion with one of the attack-based cyber effects (Acquire, 
Manipulate, Exploit, or Deny), Implant will improve the 
attack’s chances of success. A secondary use of Implant 
is its ability to freeze an adversary, preventing him from 
conducting any actions for one round. By using Implant 
on an adversary’s base in this way, the attacking player has 
a chance to lock out the target player, similar to a ransom-
ware attack on critical infrastructure in the real world. The 
only differences between Implant in CyberWar: 2025 and 
such attacks in reality are that players cannot buy their way 
out of an Implant attack, and actual ransomware attacks 
are rarely resolved quickly and easily.
Learning from mistakes through trial and 
error in a simulated environment is the 
key to success in wargaming and educa-
tional training.
These game mechanics, in combination with the dynamics 
(e.g., randomization and luck, risks and rewards, competi-
tion, and communication) and aesthetics of the game 
design (e.g., icons, player avatars, colors, and overall visual 
layout) function together in CyberWar: 2025 to create an 
in-depth environment for players that yields a meaningful 
learning experience and emphasizes replay value. Even 
though CyberWar: 2025’s dynamics and mechanics are 
abstractions drawn from reality, they are closely related to 
actual events and current tactics, techniques, and proce-
dures of cyberspace operations and doctrine. The holistic 
and simplified network view design allows players to 
focus on the educational value of game play without being 
bogged down with technical details and terms, all while 
having fun and experimenting with new ways to domi-
nate in the cyber environment. Learning from mistakes 
through trial and error in a simulated environment is the 
key to success in wargaming and educational training.
Learning Objectives for Cyber Training
Similar to the hundreds of wargames executed throughout 
history, in which commanders prepared for the battle 
ahead by using tabletop simulations, CyberWar: 2025 
seeks to prepare warfighters for the battlefield in cyber-
space. Although there may never be a single simulation 
that encapsulates the entirety of cyberspace operations, the 
game's emphasis on extracting and simplifying historical 
events and lessons learned in the cyber realm makes 
CyberWar: 2025 relevant for current training courses. 
For example, the nine cyber effects are not specific to any 
security tool, piece of malware, or virus that is currently 
identified; instead, they emulate various means to achieve 
an overall desired result and effect, or reinforce a cyber 
training and education curriculum. The protocols and 
standards that currently make up digital networks and 
systems may not change; however, the methods and tactics 
used to modify or control those systems or networks may 
change over time.
This is why CyberWar: 2025 does not make the intricate 
low-level details of cyber operations its focal point. Instead, 
the game deconstructs a few critical aspects of defense/
offense operations in cyberspace, reshapes those aspects 
into game mechanics, and uses them to reinforce key 
learning objectives and goals for cyber training programs. 
For its players, CyberWar: 2025 reinforces a number of 
learning objectives, such as understanding key terrain and 
critical infrastructure within the cyber domain, targeting 
cyber actors, and identifying cyber threats, as well as the 
Figure 3. First live tabletop version playtest, 2017
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concepts of offensive and defensive operations in cyber-
space, to name only a few.5 
Game Testing and Classroom Application
From the early stages of development, live playtests were 
essential for the proper evolution of CyberWar: 2025. 
More than 15 playtest sessions, conducted within a span 
of 18 months, provided the necessary feedback to advance 
and clarify the game rules, mechanics, and aesthetics, and 
helped shape CyberWar: 2025 from a slow and error-prone 
tabletop game to a lightweight and responsive software 
beta. These initial playtest sessions consisted of mixed-
pairing groups of both technical and non-technical players, 
with no more than four players per team. This diversity 
within each team allowed players to learn from each other 
through interactive problem solving by discussing their 
overall cyber strategy and next moves amongst themselves. 
Before every playtest session, players received a brief bloc 
of instruction about the rules, the background mechanics, 
and the relationship between CyberWar: 2025’s cyber 
effects and their real-life counterparts. As each round pro-
gressed, players asked questions about their outcomes with 
the wargame facilitators and discussed potential responses 
among themselves. After a series of rounds was completed 
or the time allotted for the game session was up, the game 
facilitators asked the players to make their final moves 
and wait for the results. Once the last game-state change 
was completed, the game director held an open-classroom 
dialogue by reviewing and analyzing each team’s final 
board view and discussing each of the teams’ expectations, 
strategies, actions, and outcomes. After players had some 
time to bounce their experiences and “what if ” strategies 
off of each other, they would proceed with a follow-on 
game session in most cases.
CyberWar: 2025 was designed and devel-
oped for collaborative use as a training 
aid in an in-depth cyber training course 
or environment. 
Of all the playtest sessions, the two most diverse and no-
table ones were conducted with the staff from the US Air 
Force Research Lab (AFRL) at Wright-Patterson Air Force 
Base in February 2019 and with conference attendees at 
the Military Operations Research Society (MORS) Cyber 
Wargame and Analytics II workshop in October 2019.6 In 
both game sessions, players were a mix of personnel with 
both cyber and non-cyber backgrounds and with diverse 
levels of experience in computer-based wargaming. Most, 
if not all, of the players had played some form of tabletop 
wargame, such as Pandemic or Drive on Metz.7 Just as 
before, players received a short but detailed bloc of instruc-
tion on CyberWar: 2025’s game terminology, mechanics, 
and layout, which allowed everyone to be on the same page 
and ask questions before game execution. Players then 
participated in a short five-round game to understand the 
user interface and become comfortable with the game 
mechanics. Immediately after this practice run, the game 
director instructed players to start a new game and begin 
a live-play session against another team. In the first play 
session, teams competed against each other for roughly 
two hours. After a quick post-game review and intermis-
sion, the player teams executed a second session for about 
another two hours. The point of conducting two separate 
game sessions in one event was to give players the opportu-
nity to rethink their strategies and try different defensive, 
offensive, or covert tactics. 
When a wargaming event was complete, after-action 
reviews ranged from player teams discussing their confi-
dence, initial pitfalls, and overall understanding of cyber 
operations to evaluations of the training value behind 
CyberWar: 2025. The only suggestions for improvement 
from the testers were requests for additional scenarios, 
modified applications to assist in training private corpora-
tions in cyber defense, and a single-player mode to compete 
against artificial intelligence. The game engine used for the 
current release of CyberWar: 2025 does not support these 
improvements, but an updated game engine is currently 
in development, as is a commercial version of CyberWar: 
2025. As of this writing, version one of CyberWar: 2025 
is in continued testing, and is scheduled for release to the 
public in 2021.
Figure 4. Live playtest of the beta version, 2018
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Conclusion
CyberWar: 2025 was designed and developed for collab-
orative use as a training aid in an in-depth cyber training 
course or environment. It is not, however, a standalone 
computer-based training course such as the DoD Cyber 
Awareness Challenge and, by itself, will not teach anyone 
how to be a better cyber practitioner. Incorporating 
CyberWar: 2025 into a broader instructor-led course 
allows students to take the information and concepts 
taught to them in the course and practice those concepts 
within a simulated and risk-free cyber environment. The 
iterative and randomized nature of CyberWar: 2025 gives 
players the opportunity to learn from past mistakes, and to 
try new techniques and measures to acquire new outcomes 
and experiences within the game. Players can then provide 
feedback from what they learned and engage in an open 
discussion between one another and with the instructor in 
the classroom. 
Finally, CyberWar: 2025 is course agnostic, and may be 
used whether the training program focuses on offensive 
cyberwarfare or defensive cybersecurity, or anywhere in 
between. Much like earlier wargames, the mechanics used 
to create the scenarios are only as effective as the learning 
objectives supporting them. Instructors will need to 
determine how they can best weave CyberWar: 2025 into 
their programs in order to achieve maximum learning 
effectiveness. 
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Rise and Kill First:  
The Secret History of Israel’s 
Targeted Assassinations 
by Ronen Bergman
Reviewed by MAJ Daniel Meegan, US Army Special Forces 
HOW FAR IS A NATION WILLING TO GO TO PROTECT ITSELF
from terrorists? In 1973, in Lillehammer, Norway, Israeli agents gunned down 
Ahmed Bouchiki in front of his pregnant wife. A Moroccan national who was 
married to a Norwegian citizen, Bouchiki had become a victim 
of Israel's global targeted-killing program.1 Tragically, Bouchiki 
had been misidentified; he had no connection with terrorism. 
Worse yet, the Israeli government considered Ahmed Bouchiki’s 
murder to be simply collateral damage in its assassination cam-
paign. Mossad’s chief at the time, Zvi Zamir, dismissed the disaster 
by claiming that “wrong identification of a target is not a failure. 
It’s a mistake.” He blamed the victim for behaving “in a manner that 
seemed suspicious to our people. . . . He may have been dealing  
in drugs.”2 
Ronen Bergman provides the details of this operation and dozens 
of others in his book Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s 
Targeted Assassinations, one of the most comprehensive books written 
to date on Israel's targeted-killing campaign. Researched over a span 
of eight years, Rise and Kill First lays out the history of Israel's targeted-killing 
operations, beginning in the 1930s against the British. The book 
ends with the last publicly known such operation: the 2010 assassination of 
Hamas operative Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in Dubai. Israel's targeted-killing 
program has been the most wide-ranging in the modern world, with over 2,700 
known sanctioned operations. Such killings have been documented on every 
continent but Antarctica, using such methods as shootings, car bomb-ings, mail 
bombings, poisoned toothpaste, and overdoses of narcotics, to name a few. 
Both the Israelis and their enemies have engaged in levels of brutality that 
cannot be overstated. Collateral civilian casualties number in the tens of 
thousands. Rise and Kill First is 784 pages of bloodshed. 
As one of Israel's leading investigative reporters, Bergman provides a detailed 
chronological account of Israel's strategy and reasoning behind the killings.3 He 
includes 90 pages of notes and bibliography to back up this unofficial history, 
allowing the reader to further investigate individual events. His research for the 
book created much controversy inside Israel, particularly within its intelligence 
community, which was so alarmed by his requests for official documents that 
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it went so far as to have the timeline for declassification 
of government documents legally extended from 50 to 70 
years. This, according to Bergman, was done specifically to 
thwart his access to information about government-sanc-
tioned killings. Despite these efforts, Bergman was able 
to find many Israeli commandos and government officials 
who wanted to have their stories heard. These individuals 
provided hundreds of documents and sat for thousands 
of hours of interviews with Bergman, which ultimately 
enabled him to complete his work.
In addition to its descriptive storytelling and history, Rise 
and Kill First should be important to military leaders for 
two reasons. First, it provides an 80-year-long case study 
of targeted kinetic operations against perceived enemies of 
the Israeli state, offering insight into the methods, tactics, 
and techniques of the world's most utilized targeted-killing 
teams. Second, and more important, it shows why explicit 
policies and oversight by public entities and civilian 
leadership are paramount to ensuring that military and 
intelligence operations support national objectives.
Dagan declared that “the state must 
sometimes perform actions that run 
counter to democracy.”   
Bergman outlines the systematic practice by Israeli 
military and intelligence leaders of taking matters into 
their own hands when they felt that policy objectives or 
civilian oversight would stymie their operations. Rise and 
Kill First shows how these same leaders created many of 
the same problems they were originally ordered to defeat 
by prosecuting counterterror operations in whatever way 
they saw fit. Working off a system that incentivized the 
killing of terrorists regardless of geographic location, 
Israeli commandos and assassins embarked on a campaign 
that spanned the globe. Bergman identifies a structure of 
extrajudicial killing that was often based less on national 
goals than on the emotions of military and intelligence 
commanders. He details numerous occasions when Israel 
failed to secure even temporary peace, because of personal 
vendettas by government, military, and intelligence 
leaders. For example, Meir Dagan, the future head of 
Mossad, established a secret military unit following the 
Six-Day War that became known for extrajudicial killings 
in the Gaza Strip. Most perniciously, the unit had a pro-
pensity for letting its captives “escape” and then shooting 
them because they were escaping. When asked about the 
unit later on, Dagan declared that “the state must some-
times perform actions that run counter to democracy.”4 
While Dagan’s unit initially decreased terror attacks 
against Israelis, the terror it 
caused among Palestinians 
drove them into the arms of 
the militant Palestine Libera-
tion Organization (PLO).
More disturbing is the reality 
that these military and 
intelligence commanders 
willingly carried out targeted 
killings in allied and partner 
nations, often regardless of 
the consequences to civilians. 
Israeli special operations units 
utilized car bombs, letter bombs, and IEDs against targets 
in civilian populations in myriad countries, with near 
impunity. On multiple occasions, Israeli intelligence units 
tortured captive individuals to death. During one incident 
in 1984, an Israeli intelligence unit beat two captured 
terrorists to death with rocks, and then forged evidence 
to implicate the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). The intent 
was to make the murders look like the impulsive act of 
emotional IDF conscripts rather than the work of a profes-
sional—and often extralegal—death squad. The unit had 
an implicit policy of lying to the Israeli government and 
population in order to maintain the pace of its counter-
terror operations, in the belief that lying and fabricating 
evidence furthered its own counterterrorism goals.
Perhaps the most extreme example of the lengths Israel 
went to in its targeted killing campaign occurred under 
the leadership of Ariel Sharon. Sharon, according to 
Bergman, “insisted there was no hope of accommodation 
with the Palestinians,” while a contemporary of his stated 
that Sharon could only see Palestinians through the sights 
of his rifle.5 While serving as defense minister, Sharon 
decided that civilian airplanes from Europe could be shot 
down if Israeli intelligence thought that Yasir Arafat, the 
leader of the PLO, was aboard. Despite a raging debate over 
possible international consequences and the reluctance 
of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) commander to comply, the 
IAF conducted intense planning for such an event, even 
identifying gaps in radar coverage over the Mediterranean 
Sea that would allow Israeli fighters to shoot down civilian 
jet liners without being identified. IAF fighters actually 
flew multiple missions to attack allied civilian aircraft but, 
fortunately, they were recalled each time because Arafat’s 
presence on board could not definitively be determined. 
This is not to say that many of Israel's enemies were not 
brutal in their own right. The use of suicide bombers and 
rocket attacks against civilians is despicable. However, one 
Meir Dagan
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can also reasonably assume that Israel is unlikely to improve its relations with its 
neighbors, and particularly with the Palestinians, when it regularly engages in 
extrajudicial killings both domestically and abroad. What is worse, these opera-
tions have often adopted the same tactics used by the terrorists they are meant 
to stop, and have even increased recruitment by the groups Israel considers its 
enemies. As General Yitzhak Pundak, the military governor of the Gaza Strip in 
the early 1970s, warned, “if we do not give [the Palestinians] a little assistance, 
a little prosperity, they’ll all turn to the path of terror.”6 In a reflection of this 
irony, Bergman has aptly named one chapter “More Suicide Bombers than 
Explosive Vests.” 
These tales should act as signposts for American military officers and senior 
officials looking for examples of why objectives, policy, and, most important, 
civilian oversight must be unequivocal. Military leaders must never forget that 
they serve their nation and not their personal interests or vendettas. Leaders 
have a further moral responsibility to ensure that their own conduct and the 
conduct of their soldiers are of the highest caliber. Counterterror operations are 
a messy business. Leaders must ensure they do not make them messier by adding 
their own petty objectives to the process.  
Bergman's book should cause US political and military leaders to stop and think: 
Are we doing it right? After 19 years of perpetual kinetic counterterrorism 
operations by the United States across the globe, have things gotten better or 
worse? Furthermore, are the policies and objectives coming from above clear 
Bergman's book should 
cause US leaders to stop 
and think: Are we doing 
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enough that military leaders on the ground can articulate 
them? Are these objectives concrete enough that acting 
outside of them would constitute a clear and gross violation 
of trust? If this isn't the case, it is logically impossible for 
military leaders to appropriately and adequately accom-
plish those objectives. Without clear guidance, military 
leaders are left to fight as they see fit. 
While numerous factors can be blamed for the lack of 
prolonged peace between Israel and its neighbors, Bergman 
posits that not least among those factors is Israel's con-
tinued targeted killing of civilian and military leaders, 
without a clear end state. His exhaustive work serves 
as both a dramatic historical text and a warning of the 
consequences of encouraging brave men to conduct atroci-
ties, a situation made even worse when they don’t fully 
realize the second and third order effects of their actions. 
An absolutely worthy read, Rise and Kill First should also 
cause military and civilian leaders to pause and review 
their own counterterror campaigns to ensure they are not 
inadvertently perpetuating the conditions that lead to the 
very terrorism they hope to stop. 
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As these malcontents gain power through emerging technologies,  
the defenses of the law-abiding are increasingly breached.1 
I was intrigued the first time I witnessed the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS) using unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to attack Iraqi and Kurdish forces. 
In early 2018, Syrian rebels carried out the first documented drone swarm at-
tack, using 13 drones to target Russian forces at Khmeimim Air Base and Tartus 
Naval Facility in Syria.2 The ingenuity and creativity displayed by these UAS 
tactics garnered avid attention from the US Department of Defense, which spent 
at least $1.5 billion on counter-UAS (C-UAS) systems in 2018 alone.3 Locating 
and targeting the individuals responsible for enemy UAS operations also became 
a significant part of US Special Operations Command’s objectives during its 
campaign against ISIS. For these reasons, I was naturally interested to read 
Audrey Kurth Cronin’s latest book, Power to the People: How Open Technological 
Innovation is Arming Tomorrow’s Terrorists.
Power to the People focuses on how terrorists take advantage of emerging tech-
nologies to carry out violence in pursuit of their political objectives, and how 
open technology is becoming increasingly available to non-state actors, a trend 
that has the potential to upset global stability. The book considers two technolo-
gies that terrorists harnessed for political violence when they first emerged: 
dynamite and the Kalashnikov rifle (AK-47). Applying the framework of David 
Rapoport’s four waves of terrorism, Cronin makes the case that dynamite and 
the AK-47 were catalysts for, respectively, the anarchist and anti-colonial waves 
of terrorism, the first of which began in the late nineteenth century and the 
second of which continued through the mid-twentieth century.4 These disrup-
tive technologies allowed ordinary people to force a shift in power over time 
from autocrats to citizens.
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Most military technology, such as nuclear weapons or 
stealth technology, is developed in a closed, controlled 
system to which the public does not have access. In recent 
times, however, we have witnessed an open technological 
revolution in which increasingly capable computers and 
associated technologies have quickly become accessible to 
the public through commercial outlets. The potential of 
these technologies to upset the balance of power can be 
seen in the rapid adoption of drones, smartphones, and 
social media platforms by violent non-state actors. 
Lethal empowerment theory helps to explain why some 
technologies have more potential to be used for political 
violence than others. According to this theory, disruptive 
lethal technologies are most likely to diffuse when they are 
“accessible, cheap, simple to use, transportable, conceal-
able, effective, ‘multi-use,’ not-cutting edge (second or 
third wave of innovation), off-the-shelf, a cluster of other 
technology, symbolically resonant, and given to unex-
pected uses.”5 Terrorists rarely, if ever, need to develop new 
technologies on their own, but simply take what is avail-
able and manipulate it for their particular objectives. The 
theoretical framework of lethal empowerment, coupled 
with Cronin’s thorough examination of how the use of dy-
namite and the AK-47 diffused among civilians, provides 
a suitable lens through which to evaluate the potential 
for an emerging technology to become a common tool of 
political violence. 
It is very unlikely that Alfred Nobel, the inventor of dyna-
mite, anticipated the ways that his invention could be used 
in acts of violence when he first patented it in 1867. Dyna-
mite quickly became the first cheap, portable, and easily 
accessible explosive, which is consistent with Cronin’s 
lethal empowerment theory. According to Cronin, many 
scholars overlook the fact that dynamite was the tech-
nological innovation that ushered in modern terrorism. 
The rise of anarchism was fueled by this easily accessible 
explosive, which, by destabilizing governments, proved to 
be a catalyst for major state-on-state war. As Cronin notes, 
“armed with just a few sticks of dynamite, anyone could 
conduct a terrorist attack of then-unprecedented power.”6 
The way dynamite diffused into societies played a crucial 
role in its popularization among terrorist organizations 
beginning in the late nineteenth century. Nobel set up 
Dynamite was the technological 
innovation that ushered in modern 
terrorism.
dynamite factories all over the world to meet the insatiable 
demand for the explosive, a decision that brought the 
price of dynamite down and made it easily and widely 
accessible—and also helped make Nobel wealthy. In the 
United States, a lack of regulatory oversight of the sale and 
transportation of dynamite further increased its avail-
ability to the public. Amazingly enough, it was not until 
1970 that the United States enacted a “consistent set of 
explosive regulations.”7 Cronin makes the salient point 
that once a potentially lethal technology becomes widely 
diffused, it is often very difficult to reverse the trend or 
control its spread, “especially if the new technology is com-
mercially produced, has positive uses, and stands to make 
many people lots of money.”8 
The AK-47, designed by Soviet Red Army engineer 
Mikhail Kalashnikov after the Second World War, was 
a popular technology throughout the second wave of 
terrorism and into the Marxist/Socialist third wave, and 
became a symbol for terrorists, insurgents, and freedom 
fighters from the mid-twentieth century to the present day. 
The reasons for the AK-47’s success were that it was cheap, 
easy to use, readily available around the globe, extremely 
durable, and powerful when compared to similar weapons 
of the time. Although the AK-47 was originally designed 
as a tool to help the Red Army fend off invasion, the Soviet 
Union quickly lost control over the technology because the 
socialist principles of the USSR did not provide for patents, 
and the AK-47 itself became a high-demand form of cur-
rency that could be traded for other commodities. Because 
of its capabilities and widespread availability, Cronin 
argues that  the AK-47 “enabled small non-state groups to 
take on professional armies to a degree that was impossible 
before the war [World War II].”9 
Neither Nobel nor Kalashnikov foresaw the large-scale 
nefarious uses of their technology. Similarly, the creators of 
the internet, social media, artificial intelligence, and many 
other emerging technologies failed to anticipate the nega-
tive ways in which those technologies are now being used 
by modern terrorist organizations. These technologies are 
even more globally diffused and potentially more destabi-
lizing than the AK-47 or dynamite. According to Cronin, 
“digital online technologies are, in short, atomizing mobi-
lization and shifting the balance of power between states, 
private actors, and violent groups.”1⁰ These communication 
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technologies have increased the range of recruitment for terrorist groups and 
enhanced the training of those recruits. 
Certain emerging technologies are commercially available and can potentially 
be used to facilitate acts of political violence, such as ISIS’s use of drones for 
surveillance and to drop small explosives on enemy fighters. Cronin examines 
unmanned aerial vehicles, robots, 3-D printing, and autonomous robots as 
potentially disruptive technologies in the hands of non-state actors. As technolo-
gies develop, the costs and barriers to access typically decrease. The use of drones 
by ISIS shows that “low-cost, accessible, cheap technologies can have dispropor-
tionate effects, especially when combined with surprise, as in a terrorist attack.”11 
While autonomous weapons are not yet readily available to non-state actors, 
Cronin reasons that if they do become inexpensive enough and easily accessible, 
they will most likely become another key destabilizing technology for terrorists 
and insurgents. There are big profits to be made in artificial intelligence and 
autonomous technology; therefore, companies have a strong motivation to lower 
barriers to entry and make these types of technology commercially available.
Cronin concludes by warning that the use of emerging technologies by criminal 
and violent actors should be anticipated and planned for whenever possible, 
and that companies such as Facebook and Twitter should be held responsible 
for the “content they facilitate.”12 She argues that the most effective way to deal 
with rapid technological innovation is to align “all the participants, including 
government, industry, and individual citizens, around incentives for developing 
protections.”13 If we do not put in place better defensive measures and regula-
tions to deal with the risks, she cautions, the result will be “wars of attrition that 
democracies cannot win.”14 
Power to the People is a compelling analysis of how technology spreads. By 
examining how two then-new technologies, dynamite and the AK-47 rifle, 
spurred periods of terrorism, the book offers insights into how terrorists harness 
openly available technology in order to wage political violence. In my opinion, 
however, Cronin’s analysis of emerging technologies fails to stand up to the 
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lethal empowerment theory of technology. For example, 
while one day 3-D printing, artificial intelligence, and 
drones may be simpler to operate and more affordable 
than they are at present, they still will not be comparable 
to dynamite or the AK-47 in their simplicity and ef-
fectiveness. While ISIS’s use of drones in Iraq and Syria 
was a nuisance and received much attention from the US 
Department of Defense, it in no way shaped the course or 
outcome of those conflicts. What is more, the threat from 
armed drones all but disappeared once their operators 
were removed. The most accurate predictions for the use of 
emerging technology focus on those that affect mobiliza-
tion and recruitment: communication technologies. Dyna-
mite would not have been as effective in helping terrorists 
achieve their political goals without propaganda delivered 
through sensationalist newspapers, and the AK-47 would 
not continue to be as effective as it is if not for the advent 
of the 24-hour live news cycle. While there is potential 
in the future for some of the emerging technologies to be 
used for negative purposes, I believe that it is the rapid 
growth and diffusion of information and communication 
technology that will prove to be the most destabilizing and 
powerful tool for extremists.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR  
 
Major Nate M. Smith is a career pilot with the 
US Air Force Special Operations Command. 
This is a work of the US federal government and is not sub-
ject to copyright protection in the United States. Foreign 
copyrights may apply.
NOTES
1. Audrey Kurth Cronin, Power to the People: How Open Techno-
logical Innovation is Arming Tomorrow’s Terrorists (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2019), 1.
2. “Syria: Drone Swarm Attacks Russian Military Bases,” TRIP-
wire, 12 January 2018: https://tripwire.dhs.gov/news/209478
3. “Special Report: US Department of Defense Spending on 
Counter-UAS Reaches USD 1.5 Billion in 2018,” Unmanned 
Airspace, 4 November 2018: https://www.unmannedairspace.
info/counter-uas-systems-and-policies/special-report-us-
department-defense-spending-counter-uas-reaches-usd-1-5-bil-
lion-2018/   
4. Rapoport describes four waves (note that all date ranges are ap-
proximate): anarchism (1880s to 1920s), anti-colonialism (1920s 
to 1960s), new left (1960s to 1990s), and religious extremism 
(1979 to the present). For more on this theory, see David C. 
Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terror: International 














48 CTX   Vol. 10, No. 2
These recent Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) Press publications are available electronically 
on the USSOCOM Research Library website in the JSOU Press Publications 2019 and 2020 sections:  
https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications
JSOU Publications
Re-Evaluating Special Operations Forces-Led Counterterrorism 
Efforts by Barnett S. Koven 
Dr. Koven, in this occasional paper, posits that kinetic counterterrorism (CT) actions 
undertaken by the state to kill, capture, or otherwise disrupt terrorist groups are inef-
fective in isolation. While kinetic actions may succeed in disrupting a specific plot or 
other activities in the immediate term, they have little long-term effect on the ability of 
terrorist groups to operate. This study, backed by data from Colombian CT efforts over 
several years, demonstrates that government CT activities leading to the capture, killing, 
or demobilization of terrorists are correlated with an increase in terrorist attacks fol-
lowing a government’s actions. Moreover, this study reasons that government actions also 
serve to diffuse terrorist attacks into surrounding municipalities. Although kinetic CT 
actions may appear effective insofar as terrorist violence in the immediate vicinity of the 
CT actions decreases, if terrorism is displaced to other areas, this is not truly indicative of 
success. Dr. Koven's research suggests that successful CT approaches will require carefully 
sequenced kinetic and non-kinetic approaches.
Decision-Making Considerations in Support to Resistance  
by Will Irwin with Foreword by Lieutenant General 
Kenneth E. Tovo
The intent of this monograph is to reveal to Special Operations Forces (SOF) leaders 
and planners the variety of considerations facing decision makers, the approaches used 
in strategic- and operational-level decision making, and how they can better inform and 
influence that process with regard to special warfare. This monograph is a companion 
volume to two earlier works: “Support to Resistance: Strategic Purpose and Effectiveness,” 
and “How Civil Resistance Works (And Why It Matters To SOF).” This third volume 
describes some of the factors that decision makers have faced when considering support 
to resistance (STR) as a foreign policy option. This monograph sheds some light on how 
national security officials in the past have arrived at certain conclusions and why, in some 
cases, presidents have directed actions that were especially risky or controversial.
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Village Stability Operations and the Evolution of SOF 
Command and Control in Afghanistan: Implications for 
the Future of Irregular Warfare  
by William Knarr and Mark Nutsch 
In this monograph, Bill Knarr and Mark Nutsch recount how Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) command and control evolved along with all of the Village Stability Operations 
(VSO) dimensions, which culminated in the creation of the Special Operations Joint 
Task Force. The 2018 National Defense Strategy called for expanding the competition 
space below the level of armed conflict. VSO provides a timely and relevant example of 
how SOF can contribute to this vision. Just like terrorism, great power competition will 
play out in countries with weak sociopolitical systems. The inherently political character 
and joint, interagency, international/multinational, and corporate nature of VSO can be 
replicated in many parts of the world for sustainable strategic effect. This monograph 
develops the concepts for SOF on how to contribute more effectively and efficiently to 
the counterterrorism fight, but readers would do well to think about VSO principles and 
command and control in the context of great power competition.
Resistance Operating Concept (ROC)  
by Otto C. Fiala, with a Foreword by Major General Kirk Smith  
and Brigadier General Anders Löfberg 
The primary focus of the Resistance Operating Concept (ROC) is to develop a nation-
ally authorized, organized resistance capability prior to an invasion and full or partial 
occupation that result in a loss of territory and sovereignty. Resistance, as a form of 
warfare, can be conceived as part of a layered, in-depth national defense. Toward this end, 
the ROC first seeks to delineate the concept of national resilience in a pre-crisis environ-
ment. Second, the ROC seeks to develop resistance requirements, and support planning 
and operations in the event that an adversary compromises or violates the sovereignty 
and independence of an allied or partner nation. The ROC attempts to demonstrate both 
the significance of national resilience and the criticality of maintaining legitimacy during 
the conduct of resistance operations during the struggle to restore and resume national 
sovereignty. This publication will serve as a cornerstone of knowledge for strategists, 
policymakers, researchers, academics, and practitioners involved in furthering resistance 
capabilities.
Informal Governance as a Force Multiplier in Counterterrorism: 
Evidence for Burkina Faso by Margaret H. Ariotti and Kevin S. Fridy 
Dr. Kevin Fridy and Dr. Molly Ariotti assert that a CT effect in Burkina Faso can be 
more fruitfully generated by incorporating the range of Burkinabé informal governance 
providers into joint, interagency, and partner operational concepts. Although joint 
doctrine correctly notes the host nation (HN) government must invite U.S. Special 
Operations Forces into the country, it errs in assuming that only the HN provides the 
population with governance. By differentiating between the concepts of government 
and governance, Fridy and Ariotti demonstrate how local political legitimacy can be 
enhanced—and the allure of violent extremist organizations diminished—by enhancing 
indigenous, informal governance structures. Although written from the perspective of 
CT, readers are encouraged to imagine how SOF could apply the insights in the context 
of great power competition as well.
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The Culture They Keep: The Role of Legal Professionals in 
Restoring Accountability and Legitimacy to SOF Culture  
by Jason DeSon
In this award winning paper, Lieutenant Colonel Jason DeSon looks at Special Opera-
tions Forces (SOF) culture and how the legal professionals within the USSOCOM can 
help restore an ordered value system.  He asks the question, “If a disordered value system 
is truly the source of the current ethical and cultural shortcomings of SOF—where 
individual and team considerations come before ethical standards—then what role, 
if any, do the legal professionals of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps supporting 
SOF have in enabling the commander to overcome those shortcomings and promote a 
culture of adherence to those high standards of ethical and professional conduct?”  Lt. 
Col. DeSon proposes a four-step process to help clarify the SOF culture problems and 
develop solutions.
Special Operations Forces Interagency Reference Guide,  
Fourth Edition  
edited by Charles Ricks 
Mr. Charles Ricks, a JSOU Senior Fellow, first compiled this guide over a decade ago and 
continues to provide updates and revisions so that it remains a valuable reference work 
for JSOU students, Special Operations Forces (SOF) staff officers, and partners within 
the interagency (IA) enterprise. This is now the fourth edition of this publication. This 
new edition recognizes the changing nature of the international security environment 
and the adaptive and evolutionary nature of the IA process. While counterterrorism 
and combating terrorism remain essential SOF activities, the IA concepts, principles, 
and processes discussed here apply similarly to the involvement of SOF across the entire 
competition continuum and to all SOF core activities. As noted by the fifth SOF Truth, 
“Most special operations require non-SOF support.” That reality continues to form the 
basis for this guide as it addresses SOF IA engagement across the entire international 
competition continuum.
Special Operations Research Topics 2020  
(Revised Edition for Academic Year 2021)
The JSOU Special Operations Research Topics 2020 publication, newly revised for 
academic year 2021 with 18 new topics, highlights a wide range of research topics collab-
oratively developed and prioritized by experts from across the Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) community. As with the previous versions of this publication, this list is tailored 
to address special operations priorities. The topics in these pages are intended to guide 
research projects for professional military education (PME) students, JSOU faculty, fellows 
and students, and others writing about special operations during this academic year. This 
research will provide a better understanding of the complex issues and opportunities 
affecting the strategic and operational planning needs of SOF.
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